A recent court ruling by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Burton Lifland clarifies the process for determining how much money investors may be entitled to receive in connection with the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) proceeding involving the Madoff Ponzi scheme. The new ruling specifically related to whether investors could receive amounts equaling the totals appearing on their last account statements. The judge sided with the SIPC-appointed trustee, Irving Picard, who argued that investors could claim only the amount they first invested with Madoff (minus any withdrawals).

On December 29, the UK Treasury published a summary of responses to its consultation on its proposals to reform Part 7 of the UK Companies Act 1989 and related legislation. Part 7 of the Companies Act 1989 modifies the UK’s general insolvency law to provide systemic protection for recognized investment exchanges and recognized clearinghouses in the event of a default by one of their members  

In an 8-1decision issued on May 20, the Supreme Court held that rejection of an executory trademark license agreement in a bankruptcy of the licensor is merely a breach, and not a termination or rescission, of the agreement. The licensee retains whatever rights it would have had upon a breach of the agreement prior to bankruptcy and can continue to use the trademarks pursuant to its contractual rights under applicable law. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. ___, No. 17-1657 (May 20, 2019).

Background

A federal appeals court in Illinois held that Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and Bank of New York (collectively, “BNYM”) were on “inquiry notice” that Sentinel Management Group, Inc. improperly used customer funds as collateral for a loan prior to the firm’s collapse in August 2007. (Sentinel was an investment management firm registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a futures commission merchant that claimed it specialized in short-term cash management for hedge funds, individuals, financial institutions and other FCMs.

The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware recently reversed a Court of Chancery decision declining to appoint a receiver for a dissolved Delaware corporation, Krafft-Murphy Company, Inc. (Krafft). The Chancery Court determined that a receiver was inappropriate because Krafft had no property for the receiver to distribute to potential tort victims. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an unexhausted insurance policy is property of the dissolved company even after its three-year wind-up period under Delaware law.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently found that a debtor’s transfer of property owned by a corporation in which the debtor allegedly held a 50% interest did not automatically constitute a transfer of assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. After the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary complaint alleging that the debtor purposefully had executed a post-petition mortgage lien on certain real property owned by a corporation of which the debtor was a 50% owner.

Reversing a controversial decision and judgment of the bankruptcy court, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has held that a group of lenders who received payment in settlement of their defaulted debt from the proceeds of new loans secured by the assets of certain subsidiaries of TOUSA, Inc. which were not themselves liable on that debt, did not receive fraudulent transfers.

Beneficiaries of a Ponzi scheme who were subsequently found liable to cheated investors under state securities laws could not discharge this liability under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma ruled.

The Securities and Exchange Commission brought an action against several individuals and related investment entities (the Wextrust Entities) who allegedly participated in a Ponzi scheme that purportedly defrauded over 1,000 investors of approximately $255 million.

What Is the "Rule in Gibbs"?

The rule in Gibbs is a long-established common law principle in which the Court of Appeal determined that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged or compromised by a foreign insolvency proceeding(Anthony Gibbs and Sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399). The rule in Gibbs remains a fundamental tenet of English insolvency law.

Why Does the Rule in Gibbs Matter?