In Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348, 2017 BL 161314 (U.S. May 15, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a credit collection agency does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") when it files a claim in a bankruptcy case to collect on a debt which would be time-barred in another court.
On April 5 and June 8, 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed bills (the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017 ("FIBA") and the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017) that would allow financial institutions to seek protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In a highly anticipated decision—HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC v. Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. (In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.), 2017 BL 83510 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2017)—Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed 2016 bankruptcy court rulings authorizing chapter 11 debtor Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. ("Sabine") to reject certain gas gathering and handling agreements.
In Weisfelner v. Blavatnik(In re Lyondell Chemical Company), 2017 BL 131876 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2017), the bankruptcy court presiding over the chapter 11 case of Lyondell Chemical Company ("Lyondell") handed down a long-anticipated opinion in the protracted litigation concerning the failed 2007 merger of Lyondell with Basell AF S.C.A. ("Basell"), a Netherlands-based petrochemical company.
Among the required elements of a claim to avoid a preferential transfer under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is that, if the creditor-transferee were permitted to retain a pre-bankruptcy payment, it would end up being paid more than it would receive in a hypothetical liquidation of the debtor under chapter 7, assuming the transfer did not occur. This requirement and a defense to preference liability predicated on it—the "Kiwi defense"—were the subject of a ruling handed down by a Delaware bankruptcy court. In Pirinate Consulting Grp., LLC v. C. R. Meyer & Sons Co.
Debtors beware: The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently expanded the ability of parties to appeal a bankruptcy court's approval of a sale of assets notwithstanding the statutory mootness rule set forth in section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.
In Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson), 2017 BL 101650 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the distinction between constitutional mootness (a jurisdictional issue that precludes court review of an appeal) and equitable mootness (which allows a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to hear an appeal under certain circumstances). The Eleventh Circuit ruled that an appeal from an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not constitutionally moot because an "actual case or controversy" existed.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).