Introduction

The High Court1 in England has confirmed the validity under English law of contractual provisions common in structured finance transactions which subordinate payments to a swap counterparty in circumstances where the swap counterparty has defaulted on its obligations under the terms of the relevant swap agreement.

The Judgment

Parties

As COVID-19 related economic disruptions place unprecedented stress on cash flows, the risk of insolvency is a new and growing concern for many businesses. Against the backdrop of a decades-long growth in corporate debt, boards of directors are making decisions that have the potential for pitting the interests of creditors against the interests of equity shareholders.

This article was first published on the Practical Law website and in the PLC Magazine in June 2016.

Challenger banks, which are set up to compete with the larger traditional banks, have seen rapid growth in the wake of increased openness to change in the banking sector and a desire for more consumer choice. Their clever targeting of niche markets is opening up plenty of scope for growth. While this opportunity does not come without difficulties, the rewards for challenger banks that succeed can be considerable.

The defendant was the sole director of a company which went into liquidation. Almost six years after his appointment as liquidator, the claimant commenced proceedings seeking an order pursuant to s 212 Insolvency Act 1986 that the defendant contribute to the company’s assets on the basis that he had acted in breach of duty of care and skill and in breach of fiduciary duty owed to the company, which had resulted in the company’s deficiencies.

The recent decision in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail - UK 2007 - 3BL PLC (Eurosail) has provided helpful guidance on the interpretation of the insolvency tests set out in section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986. This guidance is not only relevant to companies with financial problems. The common practice of drafting contractual events of default by reference to section 123 means that it has significance to anyone who is creating or is party to contracts (whether finance documents or other commercial contracts) containing this type of provision.

A husband and wife jointly owned their property. In matrimonial proceedings, the husband was ordered to transfer his interest in the property to the wife. Following his bankruptcy, the husband’s trustee applied to set aside the property transfer on the basis that it had been made at an undervalue, and the wife had given no consideration in money or money’s worth within the meaning of s339 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The wife contended that the fact that she had foregone ancillary relief claims was capable of amounting to consideration.

A notice of intention to appoint administrators (a Notice), although not an absolute bar to making a final charging order, will generally act as a moratorium. This prevents creditors from taking steps to enforce their claims against a company without the permission of the court.

MB had been the secured tenant of a property in which she lived with B, and which she had bought at a substantial discount. The property was conveyed into the joint names of MB and B as joint tenants. Although MB’s mortgage company had insisted the property be in joint names, she claimed that the intention had always been that B would only have a minimal interest in it. He had made no contribution to the purchase price, mortgage repayments or household expenses. When MB had ascertained the effect of the joint tenancy, she gave notice of severance to B.

In June 2007 we reported on the decision in Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v PRG Powerhouse Limited. Although the case has given rise to a great deal of debate, until now there has been no subsequent reported case in which the court has had to consider whether and how a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) might fairly effect a compromise of a landlord's claim against a guarantor of its tenant.

The claimant appealed against a decision that her former husband’s one third interest in the matrimonial home vested in his trustee in bankruptcy (the first defendant) free from any rights asserted by her, so permitting an order for possession and sale of the property. The claimant argued that pursuant to a matrimonial consent order made prior to the bankruptcy, she had a right of exclusive occupation of the property until remarriage, cohabitation or death.