Introduction
The Ninth Circuit recently held that: (1) bankruptcy courts lack the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on all fraudulent transfer claims against non-claimants, whether brought under state or federal law, and (2) a defendant can waive such an argument by not asserting the applicability of Stern v. Marshall1 at the trial level.2 Further, in dicta, the court noted that bankruptcy courts may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in matters in which the bankruptcy court cannot issue final orders.
In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.
Judge John Koeltl in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently denied a motion to dismiss a securities class action arising, in part, from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing.
On May 26, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) filed a motion requesting the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York to establish August 24 as the deadline for filing proofs of claim against LBHI and its affiliates, and to establish a procedure for such filing, including a required form to be completed online relating to derivatives claims, and a new proof of claim form specific to this case.
The District Court sustained claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deepening insolvency asserted by the successor-in-interest to the Committee of Unsecured Creditors of DVI, a defunct company, against DVI’s former officers and directors.
Alerts and Updates
The rule becomes effective one year after it is published in the Federal Register.
On October 30, 2020, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a final rule revising Regulation F, 12 CFR part 1006, which implements the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq. (FDCPA).
Landlords are often among the very first to feel the impacts of their tenant’s financial woes. In today’s unpredictable economic environment, many businesses are forced to shut their stores temporarily while the risks of COVID-19 continue to play out. Within the last few days many large and small retailers have unilaterally announced publicly that they would not be paying upcoming rent. In these unprecedented times, landlords must be aware of the risks they face in light of what is certain to be a previously unheard of level of tenant defaults.
In one of the first decisions issued this year by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court addressed an issue of first impression. In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, n/k/a Old Cold LLC, No. 16-9016 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2018), the First Circuit held that the omission of trademarks from the definition of “intellectual property” in Section 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code, as incorporated by Section 365(n), leaves a trademark licensee with nothing more than a claim for damages upon the rejection of its license under Section 365(a).
In today's low interest rate environment, the difference between a contractual interest rate and the federal judgment rate can be quite significant. It is not surprising, therefore, that this issue has become hotly litigated in cases involving solvent Chapter 11 debtors. Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Colfin Bulls Funding A v. Paloian (In re Dvorkin Holdings), 547 B.R. 880 (N.D. Ill.