CURRENTLY, NEGOTIATION and documentation of claims trades remain largely unregulated, with only limited oversight from bankruptcy courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Generally, the bankruptcy court’s, or the claims agent’s, involvement in claims trading is ministerial, i.e., maintaining the claims register and recording transfers if the form complies with the rule. Only if there is an objection to a claims transfer does the bankruptcy court become involved in the substance of a transfer.
Previously, on June 16, 2010, the Joint Administrators (the “Administrators”) of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (“LBIE”) announced that they would be testing the feasibility of their so-called Consensual Approach to the resolution of LBIE’s unsecured creditor claims. They anticipated the Consensual Approach would be applicable to financial trading creditors ("FTCs") and conceptually outlined the Consensual Approach as follows:
The Joint Administrators (the “Administrators”) of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (“LBIE”) announced on Oct. 5, 2009, that they are developing a contractual (i.e., non-judicial) alternative to their proposed Scheme of Arrangement, which is the subject of an appeal following a decision by the High Court in London that it lacks jurisdiction to implement the scheme.
The Prior Proposed Scheme of Arrangement
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on July 15, 2008, that a major creditor with a seat on the debtor’s board of directors and a 10.6% equity interest was not an insider in a bankruptcy preference suit. In re U.S. Medical, Inc., 2008 WL2736658 (10th Cir. 7/15/08).
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on May 18, 2007, the Delaware Chancery Court’s dismissal of a breach of fiduciary duty suit brought by a creditor against certain directors of Clearwire Holdings Inc. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, C.A. No. 1456-N (May 18, 2007).
Whether a creditor may assert a direct claim against corporate directors for breach of fiduciary duty when the corporation is insolvent or in the so-called “zone of insolvency.”
Answer: No.
For the second time in four weeks, a U.S. district court questioned the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual third-party releases as part of a plan of reorganization.
On Oct. 27, 2020, Judge Marvin Isgur for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that (1) a make-whole premium was not interest or unmatured interest and thus not subject to disallowance, (2) a make-whole claim was enforceable as liquidated damages under New York law and (3) the solvent debtor exception survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and the Noteholders were entitled to postpetition interest at the contractual default rate.
“[A] party moving for substantive consolidation must provide notice of the motion to the creditors of a putative consolidated non-debtor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Sept. 9, 2019. In re Mihranian, 2019 WL 4252115 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).
“The right of setoff … allows entities to apply their mutual debts against each other to avoid the pointless exercise of ‘making A pay B when B owes A.’” held the Seventh Circuit on Aug. 17, 2018. Berg v. Social Security Administration, 900 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2018). But the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) limits “a creditor’s right of setoff during the ninety-day period prior to the” date of bankruptcy, said the court. Id.
“[T]he Bankruptcy Code does not permit [an undersecured] creditor . . . to advance an unsecured claim for post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees,” held the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on Nov. 27, 2017. Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. Iii v. Faison, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195267, *8 (E.D. N. C. Nov. 27, 2017). Affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court agreed that “the Code is most properly interpreted to allow only oversecured creditors to add post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees.” Id., at *10.