The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”) requires an employer to give 60 days’ advance written notice prior to a plant closing or mass layoff. Frequently, as a company encounters financial distress—a situation that often leads to a plant closing or mass layoff— creditors exercise greater control over the entity in an attempt to recover debts owed to them. When the faltering company fails to provide the requisite WARN notice, terminated employees often assert that WARN liability should attach to such creditors. In Coppola v. Bear, Stearns & Co.

The Ninth Circuit, in Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2020), issued a significant decision on the issue of whether nonconsensual third-party releases are ever permitted in Chapter 11 plans. Distinguishing its prior decisions on the topic, the Ninth Circuit permitted a nonconsensual third-party release that was limited to the exculpation of participants in the reorganization from claims based on actions taken during the case.

Statutory Background

The Bottom Line

In an opinion dated Jan. 10, 2020, Bankruptcy Judge Craig A. Gargotta of the Western District of Texas (San Antonio Division) held that a creditor who submits a proof of claim in bankruptcy waives its right to a jury trial, regardless of whether the creditor has couched its claim in protective language purporting to reserve its right to a jury trial. See Schmidt v. AAF Players LLC (In re Legendary Field Exhibitions LLC), 19-05053 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2020).

What Happened?

Background

On May 20, 2019, in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019), the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits, holding that a licensor’s rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy constitutes a prepetition breach, but does not terminate the license.

The Bottom Line

The bankruptcy of Energy Future Holdings has spawned numerous decisions in the various segments of its Chapter 11 case. Yet another such decision was handed down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware in March of this year, in which the court addressed the question of what constitutes collateral, and proceeds of collateral, in a complex Chapter 11 reorganization.

The Bottom Line

Addressing an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the Court in Mantiply v. Horne (In re Horne), 876 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017), recently held that section 362(k)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes payment of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by debtors in successfully pursuing an action for damages resulting from an automatic stay violation and in defending the damages award on appeal.

What Happened?

Unlike an opinion, an order of the court is often not from the pen of the judge. Typically, a court order is submitted to the judge after negotiation among the parties. So, when a disagreement arises among the parties regarding the interpretation of the court’s order, how does the judge who signed the order go about resolving the matter? The issue came up not long ago in Outer Harbor Terminal LLC (Bkr. D. Del. May, 5, 2017), in which Judge Laurie Silverstein of the District of  Delaware bankruptcy court was confronted with a dispute over her own final DIP order.

Just one year after Lyondell Chemical Company (Lyondell) and Basell AF (Basell) consummated a nearly $20 billion merger of their businesses, the merged business of LyondellBasell Industries (LBI) “failed in a colossal manner.”1 As part of the bankruptcy process that followed, a court-appointed litigation trust (the Trust) filed suit for the benefit of unsecured creditors against numerous parties involved in the merger, bringing actual a

In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.

Background