On February 25, 2020, in Rodriguez v. FDIC,1 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected the application of the so-called “Bob Richards” rule, a judicial doctrine that was developed in the context of a bankruptcy case almost 60 years ago concerning ownership of tax refunds secured by the parent corporate entity on behalf of a bankrupt subsidiary included in a consolidated group tax return.
On February 25, 2020, in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, No. 18-1269 (U.S. 2020), the U.S. Supreme Court effectively ruled that the so-called “Bob Richards rule” should not be used to determine which member of a group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return is entitled to a federal income tax refund.
On February 25, 2020, the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation[1] struck down a judicial federal common law rule—known as the Bob Richards rule—that is used by courts to allocate tax refunds among members of a corporate affiliated group where the group does not have a written tax sharing agreement in place, or, at least in some federal Circuits, where an agreement fails to allocate the refunds unambiguously.
On Feb. 25, The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,[1] a case involving a dispute between (1) the trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct bank holding company, and (2) the FDIC, as receiver for the bank holding company’s failed bank subsidiary, over the ownership of a federal income tax refund that was payable by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to the bank holding company as the parent of a consolidated tax filing group.
A bankruptcy court’s preliminary injunction was “not a final and immediately appealable order,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on Dec. 10, 2019. In re Alcor Energy, LLC, 2019 WL 6716420, 4 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2019). The court declined to “exercise [its] discretion” under 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) to hear the interlocutory appeal. Id., citing 16 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §3926.1 (3d ed. 2017) (“There is no provision for appeal as of right from an injunction order of a bankruptcy judge to the district court.”).
On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit held that appellants’ state law constructive fraudulent transfer claims were preempted by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors that exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for
Declining foreclosure volume has created a “new normal” in default levels, but servicers can’t get complacent. Ted Manley explains why now is the perfect time to optimize processes with talent and technology to prepare for the inevitable volume increase.
HousingWire: What are some of the pressing issues facing servicers right now from a regulatory standpoint?
Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan generally requires the consent of each impaired class of creditors. A debtor can “cramdown” a plan over creditor dissent, however, as long as at least one class of impaired claims accepts the plan.
When the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) revised the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 2005, Section 1325 was amended to add a new paragraph that is affectionately referred to as the “hanging paragraph.” It states:
When can a Federal Court employ a federal common law rule to make its decision in the case? Justice Gorsuch answer this in Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., U.S., No. 18-1269, 2/25/20.[1] The answer . . . less often than you might think.