When a loan is secured by real property, the current value of the property will be a determining factor in how the lender is treated in bankruptcy and will drive the lender’s bidding strategy in foreclosure. Valuing real property has never been an exact science. Volatility in the residential and commercial real estate markets over the last two years has made it even harder for lenders to rely with confidence on the appraisals they obtain to plan and predict how they will fare in bankruptcy or in foreclosure.
Reprinted with permission from the March 18, 2011 issue of The Legal Intelligencer © 2010 ALM Media Properties, LLC. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. All rights reserved.
Over the last couple of years, the predominant goal in many business bankruptcy proceedings has been the sale of substantially all of the estate's assets. Such bankruptcy sales are often favored by buyers under Section 363(f), which enables a "free and clear" transfer of the assets.
A California federal district court granted temporary injunctive relief, requiring the purchaser of a bankrupt hospital to temporarily recognize and bargain with the union that represented nurses employed by the hospital’s seller, pending the outcome of a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) hearing.
When a company saddled with potential environmental liabilities seeks bankruptcy protection, the goals of Chapter 11—giving the reorganized debtor a “fresh start” and fairly treating similarly situated creditors—can conflict with the goals of environmental laws, such as ensuring that the “polluter pays.” Courts have long struggled to reconcile this tension.
In a recent decision arising out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Global Industrial Technologies, Inc. (GIT),1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that insurance companies that had issued liability insurance policies to a manufacturer before its bankruptcy filing had standing to object to confirmation of the company’s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, even though the plan had been designed to be “insurance neutral” with regard to the policies.
Under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee or debtor-in-possession may sell property free and clear of “any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.” Thus, a buyer can generally acquire assets from a bankruptcy estate without subjecting itself to liability or claims based on the seller’s prior actions. InMorgan Olson, LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), No. 02-16131, 2011 WL 766661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
In a decision entirely consistent with its ruling in the “Perpetual” adversary proceeding last year, on May 12, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Lehman chapter 11 cases endorsed a strict interpretation of certain Bankruptcy Code provisions to the benefit of Lehman, which will result in Lehman having more leverage in its negotiations with derivatives counterparties. See Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Trustee, Adv. Proc. 09-01032 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011).
Last month, the United States Court of Appeals in two separate circuits held that liability insurers have standing as parties in interest to appear and be heard in an insured's Chapter 11 case where the insurer might be liable to indemnify the claims of the insured's creditors.
In two recent decisions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has interpreted narrowly certain of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.
In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).