Matthew Czyzyk, Natalie Blanc, Natalie Raine and Emily Ma, Ropes & Gray

This is an extract from the 2024 edition of GRR's Europe, Middle East and Africa Restructuring Review. The whole publication is available here.

Evolution of the super scheme

FRST GROUP RESTRUCTURING PLAN SANCTIONED

EVOLUTION OF THE SUPER SCHEME

In brief

Following the second longest sanction hearing in restructuring plan history, and the only sanction hearing yet to morph into a second convening hearing, the Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by Project Lietzenburger Strae Holdco S..r.L (plan company) has been sanctioned.1 The plan is part of a highly contested, complex, cross-border restructuring of more than EUR1 billion of debt documented under German law.

It involved

ICC Judge Mullen’s judgment in Sriram v Revenue & Customs & Anor [2024] EWHC 853 (Ch) follows an application by the bankrupt, Ms Sriram, to annul a bankruptcy order made against her on a petition of HMRC in circumstances in which proper service of both the statutory demand and the petition was contested and in which her capacity to understand the proceedings against her was also in issue.

HMRC has taken an increasingly active role in opposing restructuring plans with which it does not agree

Previously in this series, we explored whether restructuring plans present an alternative to formal insolvency, as well as the court's ability to exercise a cross-class cram down on opposing creditors.

Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors

Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan

The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

When does the directors' duty arise to consider creditors' interests in the face of insolvency if a liability is disputed? Hayley Capani and Kate Garcia consider the case of Hunt v Singh and conclude we still don't have all the answers.

If a company becomes insolvent, it is crucial that its directors comply with their legal duties. Failure to do so can result in personal liability for the company’s debts as well as legal action and disqualification from being a company director or being involved in a company in the future.

We look at exactly what a director’s duties on company insolvency are and some of the risks to be aware of in dealing with an insolvency.

What is insolvency?

In a recent case, the High Court has had one of its first opportunities to consider BTI v Sequana [2022] UKSC 25 (see our previous update here), in which the Supreme Court gave important guidance on the existence and scope of the duty of company directors to have regard to the interests of creditors (the so-called “creditor duty”, which arises in an insolvency scenario).

In this Update we take a look at key legal developments for trustees of occupational pension schemes over the past quarter. These include some important cases such as the decision in Virgin Media Limited v NTL Pension Trustees II Limited regarding the consequences of failing to obtain a section 37 certificate, and the decision in British Broadcasting Corporation v BBC Pension Trust Limited regarding whether a reference to members' "interests" in a scheme amendment power included the right to continue to accrue future service benefits.