One of the effects of commercial globalization is that the bankruptcy filing of a debtor with transnational business relationships will sometimes result in a clash between the substantive bankruptcy laws of different countries.  A frequent question is whether the bankruptcy laws of a foreign country should be brought to bear upon creditors located in the United States, even where foreign bankruptcy law is at odds with the laws of the United States. 

In a decision that demonstrates the potentially broad impact of the forthcoming Supreme Court decision in Bellingham, the Fifth Circuit held that bankruptcy judges may not “determine” non-core matters even where the parties consent. BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C. (In re BP RE, L.P.), No. 12-51270 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 2013), see Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 133 S.Ct. 2880 (2013) (set for oral argument January 14, 2014).

Adding to the split of authority that has developed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), in Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 12-1349 (Aug. 21, 2013), the 7th Circuit aligned with the 6th Circuit’s decision in Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012), to hold that a party may not consent or waive objection to the limited Constitutional authority of an Article I bankruptcy court.

In In the Matter of Castleton Plaza, LP,¹ the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a new value plan that leaves creditor claims unpaid must be subjected to a market test if the new value is contributed by an insider. The decision by the Seventh Circuit expanded the competition requirement to insiders whether or not the insider is a holder of a claim or interest against the debtor.

Rejecting the formalistic approach, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in Indianapolis Downs, LLC¹ focused on the policies underlying the idea of the disclosure statement to uphold a post-petition lock-up agreement, entered into before approval of a disclosure statement, with sophisticated financial players who had access to the material information that the disclosure statement would have provided.

In a measured opinion hewing closely to standard principles of contract interpretation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105, slip op. (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2012), rejected the notion that a sovereign may issue bonds governed by New York state law and subject to the jurisdiction of the state’s courts, and then restructure those bonds in a manner that violates New York state law.

Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.

In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.

On June 13, 2012, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas in In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (“Vitro SAB”) declined to recognize and enforce an order issued by the Federal District Court for Civil and Labor Matters for the State of León, Mexico, which approved Vitro SAB’s reorganization plan in its Mexican insolvency proceeding (known as a concurso mercantil proceeding). Vitro S.A.B. v. ACP Master Fund, Ltd., et al. (In re Vitro S.A.B.), Case No. 11–33335 (HDH), 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 13, 2012).

Admonishing that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be decided based on whether a plaintiff's complaint is plausible rather than how plausible it is, which was the district's view in granting a dismissal motion, the Second Circuit, in Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.,[1] declared improper the district court's denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint and vacated the dismissal.