The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that “escrow funds, insurance proceeds, or miscellaneous proceeds” are protected by the anti-modification provisions for Chapter 13 bankruptcies as “incidental property” under the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in the federal Bankruptcy Code.

On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.

On February 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, addressing an apparent issue of first impression, ruled that a series of gas supply contracts might constitute “commodity forward agreements” and, in turn, “swap agreements,” exempt from the court-appointed trustee’s avoidance actions.1 The Court reversed and remanded the decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which had held that the commodity supply contracts at issue were insufficiently tied to financial markets to be considered protected “commodity forwar

In National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc. v. Liberty Electric Power, LLC (In re National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc.),1 the Fourth Circuit held that, where an unsecured creditor receives payment from a non-debtor guarantor in partial satisfaction of a claim against the debtor, for purposes of the creditor's claim against the debtor, the creditor may not choose to allocate such payment to post-petition interest.

On April 18, 2007, in Fla. Dep’t. of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the stamp tax exemption of 11 USC § 1146(c)2 may apply to transfers of assets that were necessary to the consummation of a bankruptcy plan of reorganization and were made prior to confirmation of the plan. In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits to the contrary and thus created a split among the circuits on this issue.

On March 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., case docket no. 127 S.Ct. 1199 (2007), that federal bankruptcy law does not preclude an unsecured creditor from obtaining attorney’s fees authorized by a valid prepetition contract and incurred in postpetition litigation. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s ruling in Fobian v. Western Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.

We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws.

The Bottom Line

The Bottom Line

The Bottom Line