The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 1, 2013, that a bankruptcy court had not erred in applying a prime plus 1.75 percent interest rate to a secured lender’s $39 million claim under a "cramdown" plan of reorganization. Wells Fargo Bank N.A v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC (In the Matter of Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 776317 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2013).

On March 1, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. et al, (Inre Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C.)¹ (“Texas Grand Prairie”) affirming an order of the bankruptcy court confirming a debtor’s plan of reorganization over the objection the secured creditor that argued that the interest rate proposed by the plan to be paid to the secured creditor was too low in violation of 11 U.S.C. §1129(b).

The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari by United Healthcare Insurance Company (“UHC”), which had requested judicial review of a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes the State of Texas. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion had held that ERISA did not preempt state claims brought by Access Mediquip (“Access”), a medical device provider, against UHC for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code (see Access Mediquip L.L.C. v. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Co., No.

On February 26, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.¹ (“Camp Bowie”). The bankruptcy court confirmed a debtor’s plan of reorganization over the objection of the secured creditor that argued the impaired accepting class of the cramdown plan was “artificially” impaired and that the plan was not proposed in good faith.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 28, 2013, that a secured lender’s full credit bid for a Chapter 11 debtor’s assets at a bankruptcy court sale barred any later recovery from the debtor’s guarantors. In re Spillman Development Group, Ltd., ___ F.3d ___, 2013WL 757648 (5th Cir. 2/28/13). A “credit bid” allows a creditor to “offset its [undisputed] claim against the purchase price,” a right explicitly granted by Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(k). 3 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶ 363.06[10], at 363-59 (16th rev. ed. 2010).

Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.

In a pro-debtor opinion released on February 26, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a debtor may “artificial impair” claims in a class to obtain an impaired and accepting class of claims as required by section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.), No. 12-10271, 2013 WL 690497 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013).

Statutory Background to the Artificial Impairment Issue

A long-struggling company’s failure to issue written notice to its employees 60 days in advance of shutting down operations, as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act, is excused by the Act’s “unforeseeable business circumstances” exception, the federal appeals court in New Orleans held. Angles v. Flexible Flyer Liquidating Trust, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2850 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2013). 

In re S. White Transp., Inc., 473 B.R. 695 (S.D. Miss. 2012)

CASE SNAPSHOT

Affirming the bankruptcy court below in a case of first impression, in In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC, 481 B.R. 34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), a Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel held that a relapse into economic recession following a chapter 11 debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy was not an “extraordinary circumstance” that would justify the filing of a new chapter 11 case for the purpose of modifying the debtor’s previously confirmed plan of reorganization.

Modification of a Confirmed Chapter 11 Plan