On November 13, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in the Stanford securities fraud case that the appointed receiver lacked authority to “claw back” principal and interest proceeds distributed to innocent investors/creditors because they have a legitimate ownership interest in the proceeds held in the accounts. This precedent has important implications for this and other ongoing “Ponzi” scheme cases.

The Stanford Case: Alleged Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued its decision on a question of first impression before the court: whether section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to administrative claims arising under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, generally, ASM Capital, L.P. v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc. (In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc.), 582 F.3d 422 (2d Cir. 2009).

On February 10th, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed, in one opinion, two separate appeals arising from a company's Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At the outset, the Court held that a severance payment to the firm's former CEO was a fraudulent transfer. The former CEO was an insider, since he was still CEO when the severance agreement was signed, even though he was not employed when he received the actual payment. The Court held further that the company did not receive equivalent value for the severance payment.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 10, 2010, that a corporate debtor’s pre-bankruptcy severance payments to its former chief executive officer (“CEO”) were fraudulent transfers. In re Transtexas Gas Corp., ____ F.3d _____, 2010 BL 28145 (5th Cir. 2/10/10). Because of its holding “that the payments were fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code,” the court did “not consider other possible violations, including [the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] or [Bankruptcy Code] Section 547(b) [preferences].” Id. at *5.

On March 22, 2010, a three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a highly anticipated decision in the matter of In re Philadelphia Newspapers LLC, 2010 WL 1006647, (3rd Cir. Case No.

On March 18th, the Fifth Circuit held that a U.S. bankruptcy court may offer avoidance relief under a foreign country's law in a Chapter 15 bankruptcy proceeding. Plaintiffs had been appointed trustees by a Nevis court in a Nevis winding up petition. Plaintiffs filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition in the U.S. alleging that the debtor had transferred assets to put them out of the reach of the Nevis court. The U.S.

The Seventh Circuit recently held that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender's objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit split with the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal which have confirmed plans that block secured creditors' rights to credit bid, potentially making the issue ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.

On June 28, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the latest circuit to weigh in on the hotly contested question of whether a debtor can deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid as part of a Chapter 11 plan providing for the sale of assets encumbered by the secured creditor’s liens. InIn re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC,1 the Seventh Circuit upheld the right of secured creditors to credit bid, a decision that runs directly contrary to recent opinions in the Third and Fifth Circuits.

The Fifth Circuit recently ruled that a debtor can sell a preferential transfer action under Bankruptcy Code section 363 to a purchaser that is not a representative of the bankruptcy estate. Briar Cap. Working Fund Cap., L.L.C. v. Remmert (In re S. Coast Supply Co.), No. 22-20536, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1417 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024).

To shield bankruptcy trustees and certain other entities from litigation arising from actions taken in their official capacity, the "Barton doctrine"—now more than a century old—provides that such litigation may be commenced only with the authority of the appointing court. The doctrine has certain exceptions, one of which—the "ultra vires exception"—was recently examined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as an apparent matter of first impression.