The United States District Court for the Western District of New York recently granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first cause of action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), on the ground that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that the communications from defendant were sent in an attempt to collect a debt. SeeBurns v. Seterus, Inc., 2017 WL 104735 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2017). In 2005, plaintiff signed a note and mortgage secured by her residence.
The U.S. Supreme Court issued two rulings in 2016 involving issues of bankruptcy law.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument Tuesday in Midland Funding v. Johnson. A primary issue before the Court is whether the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is violated by the filing in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case of a proof of claim representing a debt subject to an expired limitations period. The case originated from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which along with its earlier decision in Crawford v. LVNV, held the FDCPA is violated in those instances. Every other Circuit Court of Appeals has since found otherwise.
In an order issued today, Judge Dalton of the Middle District of Florida held that in a non-bankruptcy context, allegations that collection of a mortgage debt is barred by the statute of limitations do not form a “plausible basis” for claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, or the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The United States Supreme Court will review a decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, to resolve a dispute between the circuits regarding whether the Bankruptcy Code provides the exclusive mechanism to determine the validity of a Proof of Claim or whether the filing of a faulty Proof of Claim gives rise to a debtor’s right to sue under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”). The Bankruptcy Code permits a creditor to file a claim if, among other things, the creditor has a right to payment.
The Fourth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims, holding that the defendant’s conduct—filing proofs of claim based on time-barred debts—does not violate the FDCPA. SeeIn re Dubois, 2016 WL4474156 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016). In the case, each of the two plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and the defendant filed proofs of claim in the plaintiffs’ cases.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division recently ruled that debtors’ FCCPA and TCPA claims did not arise out of and were not related to their mortgage to fall under the jury waiver provisions in the mortgage where the claims arose out of attempts to enforce a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy.
The Court also ruled the debtors sufficiently stated a claim under FCCPA by alleging the creditor received notice of the debtors’ bankruptcy case to constitute actual knowledge the debtors’ were represented by counsel.
On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348 (Oct. Term 2016) to resolve a split among the Circuits as to the FDCPA’s prohibition against deceptive collection practices in the context of filing proofs of claim for debts where a collection action would otherwise be time-barred.
Lots of people and companies buy old debt—for example, hedge funds, private equity firms, and even some commercial bank affiliates. Typically, this is debt that the original creditor has charged off and sold for a fraction of the legal balance. In some cases, the debt has grown so old that a statute of limitations makes it technically unenforceable. But that doesn’t always stop the debt buyer from attempting collection.
A recent opinion issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reminds us that corporate veil-piercing liability is not exclusive to shareholders. Anyone who is in control of and misuses the corporate structure can be found liable for the obligations of the corporation. The facts of this case, however, did not support personal liability for veil-piecing.