Parties to an appeal who condition a settlement on the vacating of the lower court’s judgment “may still [have] an appropriate remedy,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on July 12, 2016. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., 2016 U.S. App LEXIS 12813, *15 (11th Cir. July 12, 2016). Reversing the district court’s “narrow” refusal to vacate its judgment after the parties had settled, the Eleventh Circuit found that “exceptional circumstances” warranted the vacatur. Id., at *3, *14.

When an adversary proceeding is transferred to the district court pursuant to a withdrawal of the reference, which rules—and deadlines—apply: those contained within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or those contained within the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure? The Eleventh Circuit recently held the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, govern adversary proceedings before the district courts. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 2016 WL 1392642 (11^th Cir. 2016).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that “[a]n accurate and complete proof of claim on a time-barred debt is not false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable under the FDCPA.”

In arriving at this holding, the Court declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s rulings in Crawford and Johnson.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The Eleventh Circuit has made it clear: it will not back down from its decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, a decision it issued in 2014 and one which has been the subject of hot debate ever since. In Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the filing of a proof of claim was an attempt to collect a debt and the filing of a proof of claim on time-barred debt violated the FDCPA. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11^th Cir. 2014). Since Crawford, the debate has raged on with several courts weighing in on the subject.

The Eleventh Circuit has made it clear: it will not back down from its decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, a decision it issued in 2014 and one which has been the subject of hot debate ever since.In Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the filing of a proof of claim was an attempt to collect a debt and that the filing of a proof of claim on time barred debt violated the FDCPA. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11^th Cir. 2014).

In a much-anticipated follow-up to its 2014 decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 738 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Bankruptcy Code.

On April 26th, the Eleventh Circuit held that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act prohibits a federal district court from enjoining the FDIC. A trial court had initially imposed a TRO against a failing bank prohibiting it from taking any action with respect to $1 billion worth of mortgage proceeds it held in trust for petitioner, Bank of America, who held legal title. When the FDIC was appointed receiver, the FDIC moved to dissolve the TRO. The trial court refused converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction.

The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the avoidance of nearly $2 million in postpetition payments made by debtor Delco Oil, Inc. (the "Debtor") to its petroleum supplier Marathon Petroleum Company, LLC ("Marathon").[1] The Eleventh Circuit held that funds received by Marathon from the Debtor constituted cash collateral that the Debtor had spent without the permission of either its secured lender, CapitalSource Finance ("CapitalSource"), or the bankruptcy court and, therefore, could be avoided under sections 549(a) and 363(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

INTRODUCTION

Companies that plan to sell goods or services to a debtor in bankruptcy should be aware of a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a trustee may avoid a debtor’s post-petition transfers of cash collateral if such transfers were made without the consent of the secured party or court order.1