Recent rulings in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S.
Law360, New York (February 25, 2014, 1:26 PM ET) -- In the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Fisker Automotive Holdings Inc., a manufacturer of hybrid electric vehicles, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently ruled that the proposed stalking horse purchaser of substantially all of Fisker’s assets in a sale under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code was entitled to credit bid only a fraction of its secured claim. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings Inc., No. 13087 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014) [Docket No. 483].
Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities against another party (“Party Two”).
On January 17, 2014, Chief Judge Kevin Gross of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision limiting the right of a holder of a secured claim to credit bid at a bankruptcy sale. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., Case No. 13-13087-KG, 2014 WL 210593 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014). Fisker raises significant issues for lenders who are interested in selling their secured debt and for parties who buy secured debt with the goal of using the debt to acquire the borrower’s assets through a credit bid.
A Delaware bankruptcy court recently limited a secured creditor’s right to credit bid an acquired claim to the purchase price of that claim. In In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 230 (Bankr. D. Del. January 17, 2014), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed a motion by Fisker Automotive, Inc. (“Fisker”) to sell substantially all of its assets (the “Sale Motion”) to Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC (“Hybrid”).
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently limited the ability of a secured creditor to credit bid for substantially all of the debtors’ assets because (i) the credit bid would chill, or even freeze, the bidding process, (ii) the proposed expedited private sale pursuant to a credit bid would be inconsistent with notions of fairness in the bankruptcy process, and (iii) the amount of the secured claim was uncertain. In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., Case No. 13-13087 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014).
On Jan. 10, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al., capped a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at only $25 million (the amount it paid to purchase the claim). The decision is on appeal. While the Court stated that its decision is non-precedential, it serves as a cautionary tale for secured lenders who also are potential acquirers of a debtor’s assets in bankruptcy sales.
Facts
Loan to Fisker
As Delaware has often been selected as a preferred place of incorporation by U.S. businesses, and consequently the venue for dissolution and bankruptcies, the recent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court, In the Matter of Krafft-Murphy Co., Inc., No. 85, 2013 (Del. Nov. 26, 2013), holding that insurance contracts remained property of the dissolved corporation may have significant implications for “orphan shares” at co-disposal, environmental remediation sites, as well as for non-environmental liabilities.
CASE SNAPSHOT
When does the life of a Delaware corporation end? Not as long as there are third-party claimants with claims to assert and undistributed assets available to satisfy them. In Anderson v. Krafft-Murphy, No. 85, 2013 (Del. Nov. 26, 2013), asbestos tort claimants in lawsuits pending in other jurisdictions against Krafft-Murphy Co., a dissolved Delaware corporation, sought the appointment of a receiver to enable them to lawfully pursue their claims against the corporation in those other courts beyond the statutory three-year winding-up period.