An involuntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code filed against a Mississippi casino developer was dismissed for bad faith, even though the petitioning creditors met the statutory requirements for filing the involuntary case. In In re Diamondhead Casino Corporation, the U.S.

“Desperate times call for desperate measures” is often a rallying cry to justify harsh actions taken during times of panic and uncertainty which, in retrospect, are regrettable.  To protect against such adverse consequences in bankruptcy, there are and should be safeguards in place to prevent creditors from imposing unreasonable restrictions on a debtor at the immediate onset of an involuntary case.  In 

Introduction

Who doesn’t love a good catch-all provision? In a world of infinite possibilities, attorneys often find themselves drafting language designed to encompass a plethora of contingencies. Are such efforts sometimes overkill? Perhaps. Nevertheless, given our imperfect ability to predict the future, such provisions are often necessary and appropriate.

This is the third post in our series on Judge Sontchi’s postpetition interest decision in Energy Futures Holdings, issued on October 30, 2015. Our first post in this series analyzed Judge Sontchi’s ruling that postpetition interest on an unsecured claim does not constitute a part of the unsecured claim itself.

On January 13, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion in In re La Paloma Generating Company, LLC., Case No. 16-12700 [Adv. Pro.

In In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, the question before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware was whether an investor who “bought and paid for [one] Common Unit (including all rights related thereto),”

This is the second post in our series on 

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)¹The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.²

The question of what constitutes “equal treatment” is a question as old as law itself. Though a favored topic by the Aristotles and the Rousseaus of the world, the question is not entirely esoteric. The concept plays a central role in the law of bankruptcy – courts occasionally describe the principle of equitable distribution between similarly situated creditors as one of the “pillars” of the Bankruptcy Code.