In a recent order entered in In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525, the Delaware bankruptcy court (1) clarified the application of Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) to creditors’ priority claims arising from the delivery of goods in the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing and (2) amended a previously entered procedures order to allow for the resolution of disputed “Twenty Day Claims” on their merits.

The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).

A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:

An opinion issued earlier this year by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re SemCrude, L.P., et al. (Bankr. Del., No. 08-11525; January 9, 2009) may end much of the practice of so-called “triangular setoffs” by creditors in bankruptcy cases. The Court in SemCrude found that creditors violate section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code by setting off amounts among multiple debtors, even when exercising contractual assignment rights. This ruling is likely to have far-reaching impact given the dearth of case law on this fairly common contractual provision.

Judge Carey in the District of Delaware recently ruled on an intriguing question—can a defendant in a preference action reduce the amount of a recoverable preference by setting off the value of an allowed administrative expense claim?. Though not late-breaking news, this case provides a thorough examination of the essential character of administrative expense claims.

Section 1930(a)(6) of Title 28 requires the payment of quarterly fees to the United States Trustee (the “UST”) for each quarter that a bankruptcy case is open. The amount of fees is calculated based on the amount of disbursements made by the debtor during each quarter. But, are these fees payable when a trust, established by a confirmed plan, makes distributions rather than a debtor?

Attorneys who advise a distressed company usually work very closely with members of the board of directors. A recent opinion from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas provides a cautionary reminder to such attorneys not to lose sight of the fact that, notwithstanding that the company acts through its board, the attorneys’ duties are to the company and not to the individual board members. And, losing focus on the source of the attorneys’ duties may result in exposure to significant liability.

A majority of today’s large Chapter 11 cases are structured as quick Section 363 sales of all the debtor’s assets followed by confirmation of a plan of liquidation, dismissal of the case, or a conversion to a Chapter 7. The purchaser in the sale is often one of the debtor’s prepetition secured or undersecured lenders, which may also act as the debtor-inpossession (DIP) lender and purchase the debtor’s assets through a credit bid, with no cash consideration.

How real is the threat to the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York as the prime venue choices for corporate Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases? It appears that both are safe, at least for now.

When creditors are left holding the bag after providing valuable goods or services to a company that files for bankruptcy relief, they often feel misused and that an injustice has occurred. After all, they are legitimately owed money for their work or their product, and the debtor has in effect been unjustly enriched because it received something for nothing. Unsecured creditors do not have recourse to collateral, and typically have to wait in line to receive cents on the dollar.

In a move that surprised bankruptcy practitioners and other observers, a Delaware bankruptcy court recently rescinded an order approving a $275 million break-up fee relating to a failed merger.