On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court entered an opinion holding that a UCC-3 termination statement that is authorized by the secured party is effective to terminate the original UCC filing even though the secured party did not actually intend to extinguish the underlying security interest.1 Because the court determined that the relevant section of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) is unambiguous and
On May 22, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court, applying New York law, affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by Plaintiff noteholders against other noteholders under an indenture for approving amendments with which Plaintiffs disagreed.
The Delaware State Legislature recently amended Article IV, section 11 of the Delaware Constitution to add United States Bankruptcy Courts to the expanding list of courts and agencies that may certify questions to the Delaware Supreme Court. The list already included other Delaware courts, the United States Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a United States District Court, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, or the highest appellate court of any other state. See Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(8).
As Delaware has often been selected as a preferred place of incorporation by U.S. businesses, and consequently the venue for dissolution and bankruptcies, the recent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court, In the Matter of Krafft-Murphy Co., Inc., No. 85, 2013 (Del. Nov. 26, 2013), holding that insurance contracts remained property of the dissolved corporation may have significant implications for “orphan shares” at co-disposal, environmental remediation sites, as well as for non-environmental liabilities.
The Delaware Supreme Court recently offered new insight into a dissolved corporation’s exposure to liability for third party claims. InAnderson v. Krafft-Murphy Company, Inc.,1 the Court held as a matter of first impression in Delaware that the statutory scheme governing the dissolution and winding up of a Delaware corporation does not contain a general statute of limitations that would shield a dissolved corporation from liability.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History2
The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware recently reversed a Court of Chancery decision declining to appoint a receiver for a dissolved Delaware corporation, Krafft-Murphy Company, Inc. (Krafft). The Chancery Court determined that a receiver was inappropriate because Krafft had no property for the receiver to distribute to potential tort victims. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an unexhausted insurance policy is property of the dissolved company even after its three-year wind-up period under Delaware law.
In Anderson v Krafft-Murphy Co. Inc., 2013 Del. LEXIS 597 (Del. Nov. 26, 2013), the Delaware Supreme Court held that Sections 278 and 279 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C.
In this opinion, the Court of Chancery denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings by certain asbestos claimants (the “Claimants”) seeking appointment of a receiver under 8 Del. C. § 279, holding that the dissolved corporation was not amenable to suits commenced more than ten years after its dissolution and, therefore, the insurance liability contracts held by the dissolved corporation were valueless, rendering appointment of a receiver unnecessary. The Court also granted an opposing motion for summary judgment on behalf of the dissolved corporation.
There have been some important recent legal developments that will likely impact acquisition finance. This article will survey some of the more notable ones.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2012, overturned1 a prior District Court decision stemming from the bankruptcy case of Tousa, Inc., affirming a bankruptcy court’s earlier 2009 decision that had ordered the return, on fraudulent transfer grounds, of over $400 million that had been repaid to prior lenders of the Tousa parent company in connection with a secured financing to the parent and its subsidiaries.
In this appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed an interim fee award of $2.5 million to plaintiff’s attorneys, which the Court of Chancery granted following its decision in Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 2010), and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision on appeal in Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del.