The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware recently reversed a Court of Chancery decision declining to appoint a receiver for a dissolved Delaware corporation, Krafft-Murphy Company, Inc. (Krafft). The Chancery Court determined that a receiver was inappropriate because Krafft had no property for the receiver to distribute to potential tort victims. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an unexhausted insurance policy is property of the dissolved company even after its three-year wind-up period under Delaware law.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).
On Jan. 21, in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (In re Motors Liquidation), No. 13-2187, (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether a UCC-3 termination statement, which was improperly filed as part of the repayment of an unrelated loan, may be considered effective to terminate the security interest in question, even where none of the parties intended that result.
In In re Abeinsa Holding, Inc., 2016 BL 335099 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 6, 2016), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed what it perceived to be a flaw in the approach that many courts apply to motions for relief from the automatic stay.
Allowance of Claims—Make-Whole Premiums
In a matter of first impression, the Delaware Court of Chancery held inQuadrant Structured Products Co. Ltd. v. Vertin, No. 6990-VCL, 2015 BL 128889 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2015), that a creditor suing derivatively on behalf of an insolvent corporation does not lose standing to prosecute the derivative claims if the corporation becomes solvent while the lawsuit is pending. In so ruling, the court expressly rejected a “continuous insolvency” or an “irretrievable insolvency” requirement for standing purposes.