In a significant decision recently handed down in the Lehman bankruptcy case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a non-defaulting counterparty acted improperly by suspending payments under an open derivative contract with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. ("LBSF").
On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that there is a federal common law of receivership in the context of real property security interest, joining the Eleventh Circuit. Can. Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter, 557 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2009).
A fundamental component in the commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") market is the lender's reliance that the loan is made to a "bankruptcy remote" special purpose entity ("SPE"). The loan documents and operating agreements relating to an SPE typically require that the SPE maintain separate existence and contain restrictions that limit the SPE's debt and ensure separateness.
In a decision to be hailed by buyers of distressed debt and bankruptcy claims on the secondary loan market, on Oct. 15, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court”), in a fact-specific ruling, held that an assignment of claim does not violate New York’s champerty statute (forbidding trading in litigation claims) if the purpose of the assignment is to collect damages by means of a lawsuit for losses on a debt instrument in which the assignee holds a pre-existing proprietary interest. Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.
On November 12th, the Third Circuit affirmed both bankruptcy and district court findings that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a claim seeking rescission of a mortgage filed in an adversarial action in federal bankruptcy court after a state court entered a default foreclosure order on that mortgage. The Third Circuit held further that the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff on her Truth in Lending Act claim was proper.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held on Nov. 5, 2009, that a creditor was entitled to its post-bankruptcy legal fees incurred on a pre-bankruptcy indemnity agreement. Ogle v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., __F.3d __, No. 09-0691-bk, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24329 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2009). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit explained that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “interposes no bar . . . to recovery.” Id. at *8-9 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S.
In an Opinion issued on December 2, 2009 in the Washington Mutual, Inc. ("WaMu") Chapter 11 case, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court held that Bankruptcy Rule 2019 clearly applies to "ad hoc committees," regardless of how they might try to disclaim collective action. As a result, the members of an informal group of WaMu bondholders must now provide detailed information concerning their holdings, including a history of when they bought and sold their bonds and the prices paid. Perhaps more importantly, the Opinion packs a second bombshell.
For participants in the over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives markets, perhaps the most significant recent US legal decision interpreting counterparty rights upon a bankruptcy event of default was the September 15, 2009 bench ruling in the US Lehman Brothers chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Case No. 08-13555 et seq. (JMP)(jointly administered) ("Bankruptcy Case").