Sometimes the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code leads to unexpected results. In a recent case, the US Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (BAP) has ruled that section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the subordination of certain claims against a debtor to all equity interests in the debtor, even though such subordination may mean that the holders of the claims will receive nothing on the claims.
On January 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Peck struck down a provision that used the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”) to trigger subordination of a Lehman subsidiary’s swap claim against a securitization vehicle in the United Kingdom.1
In the case of Andrew Fender v National Westminster Bank PLC Judge Purle QC set aside a deed of release that had been executed in the mistaken belief that the company was no longer indebted to the bank.
On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.
In re Primes, 518 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) –
A mortgagee moved for relief from the automatic stay, arguing that it acquired title to property prior to the bankruptcy under a quit claim deed given to it by the debtor. However, the bankruptcy court agreed with the debtor that the deed, which was given in connection with a forbearance agreement, should be treated as an equitable mortgage.
In re Betchan, 524 B.R. 830 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2015) –
A mortgagee was the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale that took place shortly before the debtor filed bankruptcy. The lender requested relief from the automatic stay in order to evict the debtor on the basis that transfer of the property was completed prepetition so that it was not part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
Olsen v. Heaver (In re Heaver), 473 B.R. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) –
The short story is that when a deed and mortgage are executed at the same time, but the mortgage is recorded before the deed, the recorded mortgage does not provide constructive notice and can be avoided in a bankruptcy – at least under Illinois law as interpreted by the Heaver bankruptcy court.
A question facing many landlords is whether, when a tenant company faces insolvency and shows no intention of continuing to trade from the premises, they should take back the property and seek to relet it?
There are several key issues here, including:
- rates liability
- mitigating losses
- ability to recover from third parties and former tenants.
A landlord's decision has often turned on the type of insolvency faced by the tenant.
If a liquidator disclaims the lease:
Facts
In Andrew Fender (Administrator of FG Collier & Sons Limited) - v - National Westminster Bank Plc, a company went into administration. The administrator applied to the court to establish whether he had to treat NatWest bank as a secured or unsecured creditor of the company.
Last month, Jeoffrey Burtch (the "Trustee"), as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Opus South Bankruptcy, began filing preference complaints seeking to recover what the Trustee alleges are avoidable transfers under the Bankruptcy Code. For those unfamiliar with the Opus South bankruptcy, the company filed petitions for bankruptcy in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on April 22, 2009. The Opus South bankruptcy began as a chapter 11 reorganization. However, on August 27, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order converting the case to a chapter 7 liquidation. The Trustee w