Bankruptcy courts in the U.S. are widely viewed as favorable fora for debtors, trustees and creditors’ committees to pursue creative and difficult causes of actions against deep-pockets lenders and others in an attempt to augment the resources available for distributions to creditors. In yet another case, however, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (after withdrawing the litigation from the bankruptcy court), recently dismissed many of the claims asserted by the Lehman debtors against J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Introduction

Judge James M. Peck of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held, on June 25, 2013 (the “Lehman Op.”),1that claims under repurchase transactions (“Repos”) do not qualify as customer claims and therefore are not entitled to the priority or coverage provided for customers’ claims under the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”).

Introduction

A recent decision in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) in the Lehman case has extended the unenforceability of ipso facto clauses to a provision triggered by the bankruptcy filing of an affiliate of a contractual party.

On 28 June 2021, the English High Court handed down a judgment declining to sanction a restructuring plan proposed by Hurricane Energy PLC, which sought to cram down the dissenting class of shareholders and hand over the control of the company to its bondholders with a debt-for-equity swap diluting the shareholders down to 5% of their existing shareholding. This is the first time that the English court has declined to sanction a restructuring plan (since their introduction almost a year ago in June 2020), and only the fourth time that the cross-class cram down mechanism has been used.

Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).

Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan generally requires the consent of each impaired class of creditors. A debtor can “cramdown” a plan over creditor dissent, however, as long as at least one class of impaired claims accepts the plan.

Equitable mootness is a judicially created doctrine often applied in appeals from orders of bankruptcy courts confirming chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In instances where granting relief on appeal would result in overturning the confirmation order and therefore unravelling a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan, appellate courts have, in certain circumstances, abstained from deciding appeals in reliance on equitable mootness.

The Bankruptcy Code allows trustees, as well as debtors-in-possession and in some circumstances creditors’ committees, to set aside and recover certain transfers for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. The purpose of the avoidance powers is to maximize funds available for creditors and to ensure equality of distribution among creditors’ claims. The avoidance powers are not without bounds, however, as the Code sets forth a number of exceptions — most notably, the so-called “securities contract safe harbor” under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

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