“Some people have a way with words, and other people…oh, uh, not have way.”
Before ingesting too much holiday cheer, we encourage you to consider a recent opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Weil Bankruptcy Blog connoisseurs will recall that, in May 2019, we wrote on the Southern District of New York’s decision in In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, Case No. 12-2652, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019) (Cote, J.) (“Tribune I”).
On June 14, 2016, Judge Thuma of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico issued a memorandum opinion holding that a debtor could reject a prepetition settlement agreement that was determined to be executory in nature.
In our latest installment of “Breaking the Code”, we take a look at a common section of the Bankruptcy Code that comes up in nearly every chapter 11 case: section 365(a). Section 365 contains one of the most powerful rights conferred upon a chapter 11 Debtor: the right to take a step back, evaluate its contracts and leases, and assume profitable agreements while rejecting unprofitable agreements.
“You should try the chicken fried steak. It’s like a chicken and a steak got together and made a baby. A delicious, crispy baby.”
– Hoyt Fortenberry, True Blood
For those readers who have a sophisticated understanding of bankruptcy law, the holdings of Jester v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Jester) will not be surprising.
In a recent decision enforcing the discharge injunction under Section 1107(d)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania blocked a creditor from asserting a claim against the debtor after confirmation of the plan. The case of In re Trustees of Conneaut Lake Park, Inc.), No. 14-11277, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1447 (JAD) (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
Who doesn’t love a good catch-all provision? In a world of infinite possibilities, attorneys often find themselves drafting language designed to encompass a plethora of contingencies. Are such efforts sometimes overkill? Perhaps. Nevertheless, given our imperfect ability to predict the future, such provisions are often necessary and appropriate.
Today we’ll begin with a two-part question: When do you suppose you could (i) hold a debtor’s property hostage without running afoul of the automatic stay and (ii) also collect on an administrative expense for postpetition rent for leased space used to store such property?
If you don’t already know the answers to the above questions, perhaps an overview of a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey will provide some insight.