I. Introduction.
Bankruptcy Code § 365(d)(3) requires the trustee or the debtor in possession to "timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . .arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1)." In 2001 the Third Circuit construed this section to require the debtor to perform the lease in accordance with its terms. CenterPoint Properties v. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.), 268 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001).
Last year (October 23, 2009) we posted on the topic of UCC search logic in light of the bankruptcy case of In re EDM Corporation 2009 Westlaw 367773 (Bankr.D.Neb.).
Deutsche Bank held an under-secured home mortgage from a Chapter 13 debtor. The debtor was in arrears, but wanted to retain possession and control of her home. Thus, in her Chapter 13 plan, the debtor proposed to cure the arrearage, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e). The problem, however, was that the parties could not agree on the arrearage amount.
On September 30, 2010, in In re American Safety Razor, LLC, et al, Case No 10-12351 (MFW), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that the debtors’ proposed bid procedures for the sale of the business were unfair and unreasonable. The bid procedures, among other things, provided too much discretion to the debtors in the auction process.
363 Sales in General
On August 4, 2010, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division extended equitable principles previously applied in mortgage foreclosure cases to how far an unsecured judgment creditor could go to satisfy its lien against a debtor, deciding to follow a line of cases standing for the principal that “even in the absence of express statutory authorization, a court has inherent equitable authority to allow a fair market value credit in order to prevent a double recovery by a creditor against a debtor.” Moreover, in the case, MMU of New York, Inc. v.
Commercial lessors have long enjoyed certain individualized protections under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Third Circuit’s recent decision in In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., __ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2671929 (3d Cir. June 29, 2010), makes it clear that commercial lessors also can take advantage of the more general protections available to creditors to obtain payment for goods and services they provide to a debtor after it files for bankruptcy where the specific protections are not applicable.
Section 365(d)(3)
Bankruptcy lawyers who are regularly involved in distressed m&a deals have been wondering for the past few months about the potential fallout from Philadelphia Newspapers.
In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.
The concurring opinion in a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case1 suggests that trademark licensees may be able to retain their rights in bankruptcy cases, even if licensors reject the license agreements. The majority did not consider whether the licensee could retain its rights. Instead, the majority held that the trademark license was not an executory contract; therefore, it could not be rejected under the Bankruptcy Code. The majority opinion applies narrowly to circumstances involving perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free trademark licenses.