In Levin v. Verizon Bus. Global, LLC (In re OneStar Long Distance, Inc.), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18374 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 2017), the Seventh Circuit recently addressed a situation where a debtor sought to reduce a creditor’s new value defense in a preference avoidance action.
Figuring out when a pre-petition waiver of a jury trial will be respected in lawsuits brought in bankruptcy cases can be tricky. In a recent case, In re D.I.T., Inc., 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3386 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2017), a court distinguished between claims belonging to a debtor pre-petition and those belonging to a debtor-in-possession.
The next few years are expected to see a significant increase in the volume of bankruptcy cases filed by health care providers. Thus far in 2017, the number of bankruptcies in health care-related sectors, including hospitals, physicians’ offices and clinics, specialty outpatient facilities, assisted-living facilities, and other providers, has been surpassed only by bankruptcies in the oil and gas, finance, and retail industries.
Some “D&O policies” (Directors and Officers liability policies) exclude claims for losses “arising out of” the prior wrongful acts of officers or directors. The Eleventh Circuit recently interpreted the phrase “arising out of” broadly, finding that it is not a difficult standard to meet. Zucker for BankUnited Financial Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Insurance Co., -- F.3d -- , 2017 WL 2115414, *7 (2017) (determining that under Florida law “‘arising out of’ . . . has a broad meaning even when used in a policy exclusion”); but see Brown v. American Intern.
Two sections of the Bankruptcy Code addressing leases sometimes work in tandem with each other, but some courts are creating a conflict.
Section 363 gives bankruptcy courts the power to approve the sale of the assets of a bankruptcy debtor, free and clear of any liens, claims or interests in the property, under certain conditions.
Section 365 gives bankruptcy courts the power to approve the termination of unexpired leases of real estate or to approve their assumption and assignment, also under certain conditions.
Editors’ Note: The Supreme Court’s Jevic ruling last spring remains a treasure trove of bankruptcy theory, suitable for the novice bankruptcy student and highly instructional for those of us who have practiced in chapter 11 for years. We at The Bankruptcy Cave like it so much that we will be offering a few more posts in upcoming weeks on the lower courts’ interpretation of Jevic since the spring, the continued efforts in Delaware to sidestep Jevic, and other important learning from the case.
The Delaware bankruptcy court recently decided that a debtor could not assign a trademark license absent the consent of the licensor. The court concluded that federal trademark law and the terms of the license precluded assignment without consent. Because the debtor could not assign the license under any circumstances (consent was not forthcoming), the court held that cause existed to annul the automatic stay to permit the licensor to “move on with its trademark and its business.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that debts arising from a scheme to deprive mortgagees of surplus foreclosure sale proceeds were non-dischargeable, affirming the bankruptcy court’s judgment against the debtor in consolidated adversary proceedings filed by various lenders that held first mortgage liens.
A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.
On August 4, 2017, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued its ruling in Varela v. AE Liquidation, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14359 (3d Cir.
On June 27, 2017, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari regarding the decision In re Province Grande Olde Liberty, LLC, 655 Fed.Appx. 971 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 2016) to decide a circuit split on the applicable standard for debt recharacterization.