Under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) is required to satisfy postpetition obligations under any unexpired lease of commercial property pending a decision to assume or reject the lease. Specifically, section 365(d)(3) requires the trustee, with limited exceptions, to “timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from and after the order for relief” under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee.

“Safe harbors” in the Bankruptcy Code designed to minimize “systemic risk”—disruption in the securities and commodities markets that could otherwise be caused by a counterparty’s bankruptcy filing—have been the focus of a considerable amount of judicial scrutiny in recent years. The latest contribution to this growing body of sometimes controversial jurisprudence was recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

In re GAC Storage Lansing, LLC, No. 11-40944 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., Feb. 27, 2013)

CASE SNAPSHOT

The court denied confirmation of the debtor’s plan, finding that: (i) the debtor failed to demonstrate that it would be able to obtain financing to pay off the balloon payment; (ii) the proposed transfer of new equity to an individual with indirect ownership interest violated the absolute priority rule; and (iii) the plan’s injunction barring actions by the secured creditor against the guarantors was overly broad.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In re Premier Golf Properties, L.P., BAP No. SC- 11-1508-HPaJu (9th Cir. BAP, Aug. 13, 2012)

CASE SNAPSHOT

The Ninth Circuit B.A.P. affirmed the bankruptcy court decision that post-petition income from greens fees and driving range fees were not “rents, proceeds, or profits” of the secured lender’s pre-petition blanket security interest on all real and personal property (and “all proceeds thereof”) within the meaning of section 552(b), and thus were not cash collateral.

The 7th Circuit has again left a disappointed creditor with no recourse because of the creditor's failure to do basic investigation or take steps to protect itself. (On Command Video Corporation vs. Samuel J. Roti, Nos. 12-1351 and 12-1430, January 14, 2013). This case follows other cases in which the 7th Circuit has shown itself decidedly unfriendly to creditors who sought compensation through the courts in failed business ventures but could have, but failed, to prevent their unfortunate situation.

On January 7, 2013, the Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a dispute concerning the debtors’ use of cash collateral was not subject to arbitration, notwithstanding a broad arbitration clause in the parties’ underlying agreement, because the decision to allow a debtor to use cash collateral constituted a “core” issue and was a fundamental aspect of the bankruptcy process. In re Hostess Brands, Inc., No. 12-22052 (RDD), 2013 WL 82914 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013).

Background

The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) to sell bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear” of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of “any interest in such property,” has generated a fair amount of controversy.

On September 11, 2012, Digital Domain Media Group and various related entities (collectively, "Digital Domain") filed chapter 11 petitions for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  Digital Domain filed several "first day" pleadings with the Bankruptcy Court, one of which is the Declaration of Digital Domain's Chief Restructuring Officer in Support of First Day Motions (the "Declaration").  As set forth in the Declaration, Digital Domain provi

In reaction to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), in which the court held that a licensee of patents, copyrights and trademarks loses its rights if the trustee or debtor in possession rejects a license under the Bankruptcy Code under which the debtor was the licensor, Congress enacted section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 365(n)).

It is common knowledge that the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with a “fresh start” by allowing it to discharge prepetition claims. Similarly, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or debtor in possession to sell property of the estate “free and clear” of prior claims. These two concepts, while relatively straightforward, raise a fundamental question — when does a creditor hold a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?