In BNY Corporate Trustee Service v Eurosail UK1, the Court of Appeal rejected a “mechanical” definition of balance sheet insolvency.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal (the “CA”) in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL PLC & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 227 was handed down on 7 March 2011.

We reported on the High Court case of BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail in August 2010 and last week's Court of Appeal decision provides further important guidance on the interpretation of the balance sheet insolvency.

BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc & others [2011] EWCA Civ 227

The Court of Appeal has allowed companies around the country to breathe a solvent sigh of relief, as it has held that the so-called “balance sheet” test of insolvency in s123(2) Insolvency Act 1996 is intended to apply where a company has reached a “point of no return” rather than being used as a “mechanistic, even artificial, reason for permitting a creditor to present a petition to wind up a company”.  

Background

Section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides two main tests of when a company is insolvent:

In this case, a liquidator had commenced proceedings against the former director of a company in relation to transactions which were alleged to have been made at an undervalue and/or with an intention to defraud creditors and/or which were preferential. It was also alleged that the former director had acted in breach of his fiduciary duties in procuring or permitting the transactions to take place.

Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s pending appeal against the judgments of the UK High Court and the Court of Appeal in the so called “flip clause cases”, concerning the enforceability of flip clauses, is scheduled to be begin with Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited (Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (UKSC 2009/0222)) on March 1, 2011.

Rainy Sky SA et al v Kookmin Bank [2010] All ER (D) 255 (May) In our Spring 2010 e-news we reported on the case of Kookmin Bank which dealt with the interpretation of a refund guarantee between Kookmin Bank (the “Bank”) and the customer of an insolvent shipyard. The Bank issued a refund guarantee to secure obligations assumed by its customer Jinse Shipbuilding (the “Builder”). The agreement required the Bank to repay on demand all of the instalments paid by the buyer, Rainy Sky, on the occurrence of a default event under the refund guarantee.

Section 113 of the Housing Grants, Construction & Regeneration Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) outlaws pay when paid provisions, with one exception. It is permissible for a Contractor to use a pay when paid provision to deny payment of outstanding amounts due to its Sub-contractor where the Client at the top of the supply chain has gone bust. The general consensus is of course that this exception is unfair. It is essentially asking the Sub-contractors to act as insurers of both the main Contractor and Client insolvency.

In a recent high profile case brought by the administrators of 20 insolvent companies in the Lehman and Nortel groups, the High Court ruled that the cost of complying with a financial support direction (“FSD”) issued after the date of the commencement of a company’s administration or liquidation by the Pensions Regulator would rank as an expense of the administration or liquidation.