In Saw v Wilson, the Court of Appeal held that a second ranking floating charge would be valid and enforceable, even if at the time it was created there were no uncharged assets to which the floating charge could attach.
Facts of the case
Randhawa & Anor v Turpin & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 1201
In a fascinating (and very readable) judgment, the Court of Appeal has held the appointment of joint administrators made under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA 1986") to be invalid because, among other things, the appointment was made following an inquourate board meeting. Readers are encouraged to read the judgment, as the following is merely an overview of the facts and conclusions.
BACKGROUND
Breyer Group Plc v RBK Engineering Ltd
The High Court's recent judgment in Breyer Group Plc v RBK Engineering Limited [2017] EWHC 1206 provides a timely reminder for parties to construction contracts of the appropriate (and inappropriate) uses of winding-up petitions.
The case concerned a successful application made by Breyer Group PLC (Breyer) for an order preventing RBK Engineering Limited (RBK) from continuing with a petition to wind up Breyer on the basis of a disputed debt.
How did the dispute arise?
In summary:
Key points
- A practical approach was adopted by the court in respect of deadlines for submitting administration expense claims that were otherwise holding up the making of distributions to unsecured creditors.
- In the absence of a suitable statutory mechanism, the court allowed for a cut-off date by which expense claims must be submitted.
The administrators of 18 of the Nortel companies applied to court for directions on how to deal with potential claims for administration expenses.
The English Supreme Court has considered various new categories of creditor claims against a company with unlimited liability in administration where, unusually, there was enough money to pay all creditors and a surplus existed.
In proceedings commonly referred to as the Waterfall I litigation, the Supreme Court considered issues relating to the distribution of funds from the estate of Lehman Brothers International Europe (in administration) (LBIE), in circumstances where there was a surplus of assets amounting to approximately £8 billion.
In the case of Newwatch Ltd v Bennett, the court ruled that After The Event insurance (ATE) policies could not be used as adequate security for costs by the claimant companies who were based in Denmark and Jersey.
Introduction
In the recent case of BPE Solicitors v Hughes-Holland [2017] UKSC 21, the Supreme Court unanimously re-affirmed and clarified the principle established by the House of Lords in South Australian Asset Management Corporation v York Montague [1996] UKHL 10 (the “SAAMCO principle”). This article explains the clarification and the practical consequences it has for those seeking professional advice.
The SAAMCO principle
Summer 2017
Editor: Melanie Willems
IN THIS ISSUE
You Swynson, you lose some
by Robert Blackett 03
10
14
The rule of English law - why Brexit, however blindly foolish it
is, should not matter for arbitration
by Melanie Willems
Unintended consequences - be clear what you advise on
by Ryan Deane
T H E A R B I T E R [ S E A S O N ] 2 0 1 7 2
T H E A R B I T E R S U M M E R 2 0 1 7 3
You Swynson, you lose
some
by Robert Blacke
Lowick Rose LLP (in liquidaon) v Swynson
Claimant Litigant in Person recovers 150 per hour for his time
Spencer and another v Paul Jones Financial Services Ltd (unreported), 6 January 2017 (Senior Courts Costs Office)
Summary
A claimant litigant in person can recover costs at his typical hourly rate (150). Whilst the burden of proving such financial loss lies on the claimant, the burden is not impossibly high.
Facts
[2017] EWHC 1206 (Ch)
Deputy Judge Alexander QC had to consider an application for an order that R be restrained from proceeding further with a creditor’s petition to wind up B. The Judge was in no doubt that the application was misconceived. First B was not unable to pay its debts. B on the evidence provided to the court was solvent with cash in hand and a substantial unused credit facility. Further, the reason B had not paid the substantial sums claimed was that it had arguable defences as well as substantial cross-claims of its own. The Judge was clear that: