Back in October 2017, the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims (“PAP”) was launched to very little fanfare. PAP is part of the Civil Procedure Rules which govern how parties deal with litigation claims through the County Court and is the first time that strict rules have been put in place for pre-action conduct on a debt matter. I wrote an article about PAP at the time to explain the ins and outs of it.

The Facts

PV Solar Solutions Ltd (the "Company") supplied and installed solar panels. When the government reduced preferential tariffs, the Company's profits were affected and it entered Administration in May 2013. The Company subsequently entered into voluntary Liquidation in November 2014.

Much has already been said about the demise of Carillion and the impact of its liquidation on the various parties with whom it contracted. In this article, I would like to examine what light the demise of Carillion throws on themes commonly encountered within insolvency and whether there are lessons to be learned for everyone.

Having read the various reports in the press, it is clear that whilst Carillion entered into multi-billion pound government contracts, the contracts had extremely small profit margins, ultimately rendering the business unsustainable.

There are two aspects of wrongful trading and misfeasance that are of interest (i) board directors (and those advising the board) must be aware of the duties that the directors are subject to in performing their role as directors and the liability that attaches to breach of those duties and (ii) companies may be affected by the wrongful trading/misfeasance of customers/suppliers which impacts on trading.

The collapse of Carillion has raised many issues relating to public procurement, the actions of the board and the role of the auditors. But a press release by the Institute of Directors suggesting that in 2016 Carillion relaxed the clawback conditions that applied to bonuses has raised questions over remuneration governance.

At just before 7.00am on Monday 15 January 2018 following an urgent telephone hearing, a High Court Judge agreed to place six of the Carillion Group companies into compulsory liquidation and appoint the Official Receiver as Liquidator. At the same time, six partners of PwC were appointed as Special Managers to assist the Liquidators.

Carillion, the second largest building contractor in the UK and the lead on a number of key public service contracts, entered into liquidation last week. Various commentators have highlighted poor governance at the company but would the revised UK Corporate Governance Code recently announced by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) have prevented its collapse?

What caused the collapse?

A company enters into compulsory liquidation when the court makes a winding up order. Upon the order being made, the Official Receiver ("OR") is automatically appointed as liquidator, however, the company's creditors may nominate an alternative licensed insolvency practitioner to act as liquidator. A liquidator's primary function is to realise the company's assets for the benefit of its creditors.

English courts recognise that shareholders hold a separate legal personality from the body corporate they own a stake in and will only go behind the corporate veil in limited circumstances. In the recent case of Onur Air Taşimacilik AŞ v Goldtrail Travel Ltd (In Liquidation) 1 , the Court of Appeal considered whether the financial means of the appellant’s wealthy controlling shareholder could be taken into account when making an order that the appellant had to make a substantial payment into court as a condition of being able to pursue its appeal.

The collapse of the UK’s second largest construction company, Carillion, was not particularly surprising given recent profit warnings and debts believed to be in the region of £1.5 billion.

What happened to Carillion