The Seventh Circuit (which covers Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) appears to have added a new and potentially conflicting standard in analyzing  a third-party transferee’s “good faith” defense to a fraudulent transfer claim.  The good faith defense protects a third-party transferee from having to return the value it received from a debtor as a part of a fraudulent transaction so long as that third-party transferee entered into the transaction with the debtor in good faith. 

Equitable subordination in bankruptcy can be a powerful tool, providing a court with considerable latitude to set things right insofar as the estates of the penniless and the rights of their creditors are concerned.

With the steep collapse of oil and gas prices in the last eighteen months, dozens of exploration and production companies have declared bankruptcy and many more companies are expected to file for bankruptcy protection unless prices rebound dramatically. As the prospect of further bankruptcies looms, it is important for parties to understand how to adequately protect their security interests and the nature of competing liens that could prevent them from fully realizing on the value of the collateral securing their counterparty’s obligations.

Cases decided recently in Florida and Illinois call into question one legal rule that some might have thought well-settled: a first-perfected security interest in collateral beats a later-perfected lien creditor's interest in that same collateral. Seems simple enough. Except this rule might not be followed in every State.

Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code entitles the recipient of a fraudulent transfer in certain circumstances to retain a lien on the property received through the debtor’s fraud if the transferee took the property in good faith and for value.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a lender that is on inquiry notice that its security interest in the collateral had been fraudulently conveyed may lose its secured status.

However, the Court also held that the lender's negligence here did not amount to "purposeful avoidance of the truth" sufficient to justify application of the doctrine of equitable subordination, which allows a bankruptcy court to reduce the priority of a claim in bankruptcy.

For secured lenders, the single most dangerous provision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is section 506(c). This section permits the bankruptcy court to collect from the lender’s collateral the bankruptcy estate’s necessary expenses of preserving and disposing of the collateral, "to the extent of any benefit" to the lender.

In the case of Domistyle, Inc., 14-41463 (5th Cir. Dec. 29, 2015), the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit affirmed an order of the bankruptcy court requiring a secured creditor to reimburse the trustee for expenses paid to preserve real property subject to the creditor’s lien until the debtor’s eventual surrender of the property to the creditor.

An essential element to any cramdown plan is the presence of at least one impaired accepting class.  Even when a plan proponent purports to satisfy this requirement, objecting parties will often challenge the plan’s classification scheme or whether a particular class is truly impaired.  A recent decision from the Southern District of New York, 

It has long been the case that secured creditors could be charged for the reasonable and necessary costs incurred to preserve the value of their collateral.  This equitable principle emerges out of case law that predates not only the current Bankruptcy Code, but also its immediate predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1938.  As now codified in section 50