On November 30, 2018, Judge Nelson S. Román of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision affirming the dismissal of certain claims brought by senior secured creditors against junior secured creditors concerning the alleged breach of standstill and turnover provisions in an intercreditor agreement that governed the creditors’ relationship as creditors with recourse to common collateral. SeeIn re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 15-CV-2280 (NSR), 2018 WL 6324842 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) (“Momentive”).

On November 8, 2018, Judge Vyskocil of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision dismissing the involuntary petition that had been filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a non-recourse CDO, thus ending a nearly seventeen-month-long saga that was followed closely by bankruptcy practitioners and securitization professionals alike. SeeTaberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd., et. al., (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.), No. 17-11628 (MKV), 2018 WL 5880918, at *24 (Bankr.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its ruling in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp. that provided much needed clarity to creditors and issuers involved in out-of-court restructurings affecting noteholders. The issue for the court was whether Education Management Corp. (“EDMC”) violated the Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”) when it implemented a restructuring that impaired the rights of one of its unsecured noteholders, Marblegate Asset Management, LLC (the “Noteholder”).

A creditor’s ability to vote on a plan of reorganization is one of its most fundamental rights in a chapter 11 bankruptcy. For strategic investors in distressed debt, the power to vote—and potentially control a voting class (or obtain a blocking position in that class)— can be a critical tool in maximizing value and return on investment. Investors should be aware, however, that a recent decision by Judge Robert E.

Introduction

Despite the prevalence of first-lien/secondlien structures in the loan market over the course of the recently-ended leveraged transaction cycle, fully-litigated cases interpreting the provisions of first-lien/second-lien intercreditor agreements remain something of a rarity. As a result, cases providing guidance on the extent to which customary waivers included in such intercreditor agreements would be enforced are always welcomed by finance practitioners. It comes as no surprise then, that the decision of Judge Peck of the U.S.

Introduction

Several recent bankruptcy decisions rendered in the Third Circuit address whether the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to informal or “ad hoc” committees.1 Although these courts base their reasoning on the “plain meaning” of Rule 2019, their ultimate holdings are inconsistent and have generated renewed interest in this topic among lenders and the investing community. This article provides a brief summary of these recent decisions and examines their inconsistencies.

On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.

The comprehensive financial reform bill recently passed by the Senate1 creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”) that would allow the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company2 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole.