In Body Corporate 341188 v Kelly, a judgment debtor sought to overturn an Associate Judge's decision not to set aside a bankruptcy notice.  The notice was in respect of a District Court judgment and a costs order obtained by the Body Corporate in a separate High Court proceeding.  The debtor argued (among other grounds) that the notice was invalid because it was in respect of two judgment debts rather than one.

In Navarac v Pty Ltd v Carrello [2016] WASC 327, the court-appointed receiver and manager of Esperance Cattle Company Pty Ltd had applied for orders from the court to conclude the receivership.

In order to prepare evidence and submissions to oppose the receiver's application, a director of the company applied to inspect certain documents, which she asserted were or might be held by the receiver.

In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

In our June 2015 update we reported on the Court of Appeal decision in which Mr Gilbert was held personally liable for body corporate levies, as a receiver of QSM Trustees Limited (QSMTL).  QSMTL owned units in a unit title complex.  The Body Corporate sought to exercise its statutory power and impose levies on Mr Gilbert personally, as receiver of QSMTL. 

For the first time in New Zealand, the High Court has considered whether a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 can release guarantors of a company's debts.  Silverfern proposed a Part 14 compromise to its creditors and, as part of that compromise, the guarantees given by Silverfern's directors and shareholders, Mr and Mrs O'Connor, of Silverfern's debts, would be unconditionally released.  The compromise was approved by the required majority but opposed by the plaintiffs. 

The applicants in Closegate Hotel Development (Durham) Limited & Anor v McLean & Ors [2013] EWHC 3237 (Ch) were companies that had borrowed money off Barclays Bank to finance a hotel venture.  That funding was secured by floating charges granted by the companies.

On 25 July 2013 the Court of Appeal issued its final judgment in Farrell v Fences & Kerbs Limited [2013] NZCA 329. The final judgment related to three conjoined appeals in which an interim judgment had been delivered on 27 March 2013 (Farrell v Fences & Kerbs Limited [2013] 3 NZLR 82). The interim judgment held that to rely on the defence to setting aside a voidable transaction in section 296(3)(c) of the Companies Act 1993 "new value" was required to be given at the time the payment that is sought to be set aside was made.

In the recent UK case of Williams v Glover & Anor, the Court considered the novel issue of whether the right to appeal against a tax liability constitutes the "property" of a company in liquidation, in deciding whether such a right was assignable or not. In that case, the applicant liquidator sought directions as to whether it could assign the right to appeal against an assessment of tax liability to the respondent former directors of the company in liquidation. Judge Pelling QC held that while there were authorities that had considered this point, they were not binding.

In Rabson v Croad [2013] NZSC 3, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Rabson's appeal of a High Court order pursuant to section 301 of the Companies Act 1993 (Act) that he reimburse $58,084.31 to a company in liquidation of which he had been a director.  Mr Rabson sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court to challenge the Court of Appeal's substantive determination on the basis that (among other things) the High Court failed to comply with section 301 of the Act which confers on the Court the power, in the course of a liquidation, to inquire into the conduct of certain persons a

Earlier last month, the UK High Court held that administrators appointed under the Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 2011 (UK) are not officers analogous to liquidators.

The ruling arose from an application for directions made by investment bank administrators (IBAs) on the issue of whether their appointment was analogous to the appointment of a liquidator. Had the Court held in the affirmative, their appointment would have constituted an event of default by the company in administration under the terms of a global master repurchase agreement.