The Court of Appeal has recently dismissed an appeal from the High Court's judgment (discussed in our September 2016 update) setting aside a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 after finding that the challenging creditors, who had voted against the compromise, had been unfairly prejudiced by the decision to call only one meeting of creditors.

Ranolf Company Limited (Ranolf) was created for the sole purpose of acting as a trustee of the Ranolf Trust (Trust). This was the only activity Ranolf performed and its only asset was its right of recourse to the Trust assets under indemnity.

Ranolf was put into liquidation in 2014. Earlier this year, Ranolf brought this proceeding in the High Court seeking various orders to enable it to recourse to the Trust property to meet the claims of its creditors and its liquidators' costs.

In McCollum v Thompson, the Court of Appeal partly quashed the orders of the High Court (previously reported in our March 2016 insolvency update).

The director and shareholders of Rayland Investment Ltd (in liq) (the Company) applied to terminate the Company's liquidation. The Court found it appropriate to make that order. At issue, however, was the remuneration claimed by Mr Norrie, the Company's liquidator, which the Court reduced from $39,128 to $15,559.

Mr Norrie was not entitled to remuneration for unnecessary preliminary steps such as consenting to appointment by affidavit and carrying out property searches.

Ebert Construction Limited v Sanson concerned the question of whether payments made by a third party under a 'direct agreement' to finance construction are payments made by the company in liquidation for the purposes of the insolvent transaction regime. Direct agreements are an agreement between the developer, builder and financier of a construction project. The agreement in this case obliged the financier to make progress payments directly to the builder throughout the duration of the project.

In Official Assignee v Carrim the High Court considered the concept of a "gift" in the Insolvency Act 2006.

The Official Assignee sought to cancel insolvent gifts made by the bankrupt to complete a property purchase by a family trust settled by the bankrupt and Ms Carrim, the bankrupt's partner (as trustees).  The High Court considered:

The liquidators of Marathon Imaging Limited (Marathon) brought a claim against the company's director, Mr Greenhill, for a prejudicial disposition of property under section 346 of the Property Law Act 2007 and a breach of director's duties under the Companies Act 1993.  Marathon had begun defaulting on its tax commitments from 2008 onwards and became insolvent shortly after.  The Greenhill Family Trust (Trust), a secured creditor of Marathon, appointed receivers and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue had Marathon placed into liquidation just three days later.

In Body Corporate 341188 v Kelly, a judgment debtor sought to overturn an Associate Judge's decision not to set aside a bankruptcy notice.  The notice was in respect of a District Court judgment and a costs order obtained by the Body Corporate in a separate High Court proceeding.  The debtor argued (among other grounds) that the notice was invalid because it was in respect of two judgment debts rather than one.

The Supreme Court in McIntosh v Fisk upheld the Court of Appeal decision permitting the liquidators of Ross Asset Management Ltd (RAM) to claw back the fictitious profits paid out to Mr McIntosh.  However the claw back did not apply to the original investment of $500,000.

The majority found that McIntosh had a defence for the $500,000 as he had provided "real and substantial valuable consideration".  Once RAM misappropriated the $500,000 it became indebted to McIntosh for that amount, this equated to the provision of valuable consideration.

This question arose in Queensland recently in Linc Energy Ltd (in liq): Longley & Ors v Chief Executive Dept of Environment & Heritage Protection.  The Supreme Court of Queensland found that the liquidators of Linc Energy were not justified in causing the company not to comply with an environmental protection order that required the company to maintain equipment that the liquidators had disclaimed.