In a previous post this blog addressed the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Stern v.

Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has had to interpret ambiguous, imprecise, and otherwise puzzling language in the Bankruptcy Code, including the phrases “claim,” “interest in property,” “ordinary course of business,” “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” “allowed secured claim,” “willful and malicious injury,” “on account of,” “value, as of the effective date of the plan,” “projected disposable income,” “defalcation,” and “retirement funds.” The interpretive principles employed by the Court in interpreting the peculiarities of the Bankruptcy Code were in full view when the Court r

The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed whether estate professionals could recover fees expended in defending fee applications. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. _____ (2015). A divided court ruled that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) allowed compensation only for “actual, necessary services rendered[,]” and that to allow fees for defending fee applications would be contrary to the statute and the “American Rule” that each litigant pay her own attorneys’ fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.

Directors and officers of Delaware corporations face no liability to corporate creditors from direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent ruling in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, (May 18, 2007) (“North American Catholic”).

In 2006, the Colorado Legislature passed HB 06-1387, which produced significant changes to Colorado’s foreclosure laws. Although the majority of the changes were to take effect July 1, 2007, the 2007 Legislature passed HB 07-1157, which made additional changes and pushed back the effective date for many of the 2006 modifications to January 1, 2008. This alert summarizes the most significant changes that will affect both lenders and borrowers and provides a revised timeline for the foreclosure process after January 1, 2008.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

Buyers of, and lenders upon, distressed California real property can sleep a little better following a recent U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision: In the Matter of Craig L. Tippett, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18914 (September 4, 2008). In Tippett, the Court upheld the California bona fide purchaser statute against a federal preemption claim and declined to find a violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision in order to affirm an unauthorized real property sale by the Chapter 7 debtor.

Anyone who obtains title insurance, whether as an owner or a lender, should be aware of a recent abrupt and significant change in title insurance practices across the country. Title companies have recently stated that they will no longer delete creditors’ rights exclusions from, or add affirmative creditors’ rights coverage as an endorsement to, any of their issued title policies.

Weird things happen in bankruptcy court. All you high-falutin Chapter 11 jokers out there, cruise down to the bankruptcy motions calendar one day.

Here is the scenario: You are a creditor. You hold clear evidence of a debt that is not disputed by the borrower, an individual. That evidence of debt could be in the form of a note, credit agreement or simply an invoice. You originated the debt, or perhaps instead it was transferred to you — it does not matter for this scenario. At some point the borrower fails to pay on the debt when due. For whatever reason, months or even years pass before you initiate collection efforts.

There is an inherent tension between the goals of bankruptcy law and the state law doctrine of constructive trust. A central tenet of bankruptcy policy is that similarly situated creditors should be treated equally: because an insolvent business or individual will not be able to pay all creditors in full, a proper bankruptcy system must provide as equitable a distribution to each of them as possible. Constructive trust law, on the other hand, works to the advantage of a single creditor – which always means the detriment of the others when everyone is competing for limited funds.