What happens when the counterparties on both sides of a contract are debtors in separate bankruptcy cases and their estates have contrary views about whether to reject or assume a contract?
We know you’ve been spending a lot of time trying to figure out how to translate “Absolute Priority Rule,” “Equitable Mootness,” and “Make-Wholes” (not to mention “Cramdown”) into Halloween costumes, so you may have missed out on some of the entries the Weil Bankruptcy Blog has posted over the past six weeks. For our treats to you, we are handing out these entries in convenient (Count Dracula) bite-sized servings. You can indulge a little today, and we will have more for you next week.
Plenty of ink has been spilled about how to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall and the line of cases in which it sits. It is a challenging body of law for many reasons, but perhaps the most difficult reason is that the Court indicated that the scope of power that bankruptcy courts may be given today must be defined by reference to beliefs about the scope of judicial and other governmental powers at the time of the country’s founding, when divisions of governmental power were embedded in the U.S. Constitution.
Does the bankruptcy filing of a limited liability company without the approval of its “Special Member,” the secured lender serving as “blocking director,” render that filing infirm as unauthorized and subject to dismissal? Not necessarily, held the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois in a
In In re Nine West Holdings, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York overruled the U.S.
As we have discussed in prior blog posts, The Battle of the Student Loan Discharge, The Eternal Pursuit to Collect: Due Process Rights and Actions to Collect on a Debtor’s Defaulted Student Loans
It is spring and the stands will soon ring with the oft-heard refrain, the clarion call of players and fans alike, “Hey ump, read the rules!” In Rosenberg v.
When a bankruptcy case is dismissed for cause pursuant to section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the effect of the dismissal on orders entered during the case is not always clear. A recent District of Delaware decision,