Creditors often consider filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition against their financially distressed debtors. Before using this extraordinary remedy, a creditor should evaluate whether it will achieve a valid business objective. Additionally, each creditor should evaluate whether there is a valid basis to support the filing. When the debtor's bankruptcy is appropriate, it can be a valuable step in maximizing a creditor's recovery. But the stakes are high.

A debtor’s pre-bankruptcy repurchase of its stock for $150 million was not a fraudulent transfer because the debtor “could have sold off enough of its assets or alternatively obtained sufficient credit to continue its business for the foreseeable future,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 15, 2016. In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 2016 WL3315847, *2 (2d Cir. June 15, 2016). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit stressed that “the issue of adequate capitalization,” the “sole issue presented on appeal ...

On Dec. 21, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a liquidation plan for collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) Zais Investment Grade Limited VII (“ZING VII”). The plan incorporates a settlement between senior noteholders who had initiated the bankruptcy case by filing an involuntary petition against the CDO, and junior noteholders who were appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s April 26, 2011 order granting the involuntary petition.

On March 15, 2010 Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”) filed a motion (the “Motion”) with the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases (the “Court”) seeking authorization to establish certain claims and alternative dispute resolution procedures designed to expedite the process of reconciling claims filed against the Debtors’ estates.

The procedures, set forth in detail in an exhibit to the proposed order filed with the Motion, are summarized as follows:

The Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (the “BAP”) held on July 18, 2008, that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) did not authorize a bankruptcy court’s approving the sale of a debtor’s property free and clear of a junior lien outside the reorganization plan context. In re PW, LLC __ B.R. __, 2008 WL 2840659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 18, 2008). It directed the bankruptcy court to ascertain on remand whether state law permitted a court to compel the junior lienholder to release its lien in exchange for payment of less than the face value of its claim. Id., at *13-*16.

A Chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy “surrender of [two] … leases to [its landlord] could be regarded as a preferential transfer,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on March 11, 2016. In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP, 2016 WL 930298, at *2 (7th Cir. March 11, 2016).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on Dec. 2, 2011, ruled in favor of SRZ client Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., denying Enron’s petition for rehearing in Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2011). The court had previously ruled against Enron more than five months ago, holding that its redemptions of commercial paper were “settlement payments” and thus not voidable as preferential or fraudulent transfers under Bankruptcy Code § 546(e), one of the code’s so-called “safe harbor” provisions.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 10, 2010, that a corporate debtor’s pre-bankruptcy severance payments to its former chief executive officer (“CEO”) were fraudulent transfers. In re Transtexas Gas Corp., ____ F.3d _____, 2010 BL 28145 (5th Cir. 2/10/10). Because of its holding “that the payments were fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code,” the court did “not consider other possible violations, including [the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] or [Bankruptcy Code] Section 547(b) [preferences].” Id. at *5.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on July 15, 2008, that a major creditor with a seat on the debtor’s board of directors and a 10.6% equity interest was not an insider in a bankruptcy preference suit. In re U.S. Medical, Inc., 2008 WL2736658 (10th Cir. 7/15/08).

“Each litigant [in the U.S. legal system] pays [its] own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLP, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (6-3), quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252-53 (2010). A majority of the U.S.