Bankruptcy Court Decision
Introduction
The debtor in Law listed his house on his bankruptcy schedules, claiming a homestead exemption in the amount of $75,000 under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730(a)(1). The debtor represented that the house was encumbered by two liens: a note and deed of trust for $147,156.52 in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, and a second note and deed of trust for $156,929.04 in favor of “Lin’s Mortgage & Associates.” Based on these representations, the debtor made it appear as if there was no nonexempt value in the house that the trustee could realize for the benefit of the estate.
On March 4, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Law v. Seigel, Case No. 12-5196, 571 U.S.
What is IP in the Bankruptcy World?
In bankruptcy, the intellectual property (IP) licenses are considered property of the bankruptcy estate, and a bankrupt party can do a variety of things with these licenses. It is important for holders of IP licenses to know what the possibilities are. But first, what exactly constitutes IP under the Bankruptcy Code?
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, applying Wisconsin law, has held that a policyholder's bankruptcy did not relieve an insurer of its obligations to pay for "loss" under a policy endorsement that included a bankruptcy provision.Hollingsworth v. Landing Condos. of Waukesha Ass'n, Inc., 2014 WL 839244 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2014).
Bankruptcy court denizens, especially buyers of secured debt at a discount, were jolted by the recent Delaware Bankruptcy Court decision in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. In that decision, the court capped at $25 million the amount a secured creditor was permitted to credit bid its $168 million claim at a bankruptcy Section 363 sale. The $25 million credit bid cap correlated to the amount the secured creditor paid for the debt. While Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court to limit credit bidding “for cause,” the concerns he
First published in LES Insights
A new decision in Ash v. North American Title Co. holds that (1) contract damages based upon a bankruptcy were not foreseeable, and (2) an escrow holder was entitled to a jury instruction as to intervening or superceding causes (i.e., the bankruptcy). The decision also highlights a potential for some judges to try to impose greater responsibilities on escrow holders.