Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.
The Bottom Line:
In connection with the administration of the debtors’ bankruptcy case, the trustee in Badovick v. Greenspan (In re Greenspan), No. 10-8019, 2011 Bank. LEXIS 272 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Feb.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently held that, at a minimum, a substantial change in circumstances is required to justify modification of a bankruptcy plan under Section 1229.
The Eighth Circuit BAP also determined that the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the debtors met their burden of showing an unanticipated, substantial change in circumstances was not clearly erroneous, despite multiple changes by the debtor, nor was the bankruptcy court’s finding that the fourth modified plan was feasible and confirmable.
People are generally familiar with the concept that a party’s right to appeal applies to those orders that are “final.” A “final” order is one that resolves or disposes of the disputes between the parties. While an interlocutory order may be appealable at the discretion of the appellate court, the aggrieved party has no absolute right to appeal an order that is not “final.”
In a sternly-worded, sixty-page opinion last week, the Sixth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed a bankruptcy court’s $200,000 sanctions order against an attorney that arose from a plethora of litigation over an ultimately disallowed claim in what became a complicated bankruptcy.
Is anyone ready for a test on bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction? For the second time in a week, the Sixth Circuit addressed its appellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy appeals, this time in the context of orders denying the substantive consolidation of two separate chapter 7 bankruptcy estates, In re Cyberco Holdings and Teleservices Group. On the heels of its decision in Lindsey v.
Introduction
The Bankruptcy Code gives special protections to licensees of intellectual property when a debtor, as licensor, seeks to reject the license. However, the Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks in its definition of “intellectual property.” So, are licensees of trademarks given any protection when debtors reject trademark licenses? If the Supreme Court grants a recent petition for writ of certiorari, we may get an answer.
If cramdown failures are par for the course, why are we all so fascinated with them? One thing is certain: they always provide a good teaching moment for practitioners. Marlow Manor’s chapter 11 single asset real estate case is no different.