Earlier today, DSB Bank N.V. (DSB) was declared bankrupt and ordered to liquidate, ending hopes the regional lender, which last week suffered a run on deposits and was subsequently put into receivership, might be sold or bailed out.
This afternoon, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg issued an order extending the temporary stay placed by a federal appeals court in New York last week on the sale of Chrysler LLC’s assets to a new company, to be partially owned by Italian automaker Fiat S.p.A., to allow opponents to the sale sufficient time to seek Supreme Court review.
On April 10, 2009, the North Carolina Office of Commissioner of Banks closed Cape Fear Bank, headquartered in Wilmington, North Carolina, and the FDIC was named as receiver.
This week, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services held a second round of hearings, as a follow-up to the hearings held
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.
In In re Cook, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 67 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. Jan.
On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding1 holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has now weighed in on the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions. In Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., Docket Nos. 09–5122, 09–5142, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced an issue of first impression—whether Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which shields certain payments from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, extends to an issuer’s payment to redeem its commercial paper made before maturity.
Yesterday, following announcements from Ally Financial and JP Morgan Chase of temporary suspensions of foreclosure efforts in certain states, Fannie Mae issued a statement yes