Although in the Ninth Circuit the decision to revisit an order under FRCP 60 is “highly discretionary,” judges still must explicitly grapple with the relevant factors. That was the clear message sent by Judge Haywood Gilliam Jr. of the Northern District of California when reviewing an appeal from the PG&E Corporation’s chapter 11 bankruptcy.

On March 11, 2019, a U.S. district court judge in California denied FERC’s motion to withdraw the reference of Pacific Gas and Electric’s (“PG&E”) adversary proceeding from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the ongoing jurisdictional dispute between FERC and the bankruptcy court. In his ruling, Judge Haywood Gilliam Jr. of the U.S.

A dispute over whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) can order one of Northern California’s largest natural gas and electric companies – Pacific Gas & Electric Company (“PG&E”) – to reject wholesale power purchase contracts (“PPCs”) will be decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California (“Bankruptcy Court”), instead of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (“District Court”).

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee’s “breach of mortgage contract” action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.

When the fallout from failed intellectual-property litigation collides with bankruptcy, the complexities may be dizzying enough, but when the emerging practices and imperatives of litigation financing are imposed on those complexities, the situation might be likened to three-dimensional chess. But in the court of one veteran bankruptcy judge, the complexities were penetrated to reveal that elementary errors and oversights can have decisive effects.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently held that where the beneficiary of a land trust filed a motion to intervene in a foreclosure, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene because the beneficiary filed the motion after the trial court had entered the order confirming the foreclosure sale.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to the Opinion.

The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District recently held that the trial court correctly affirmed a judicial sale and denied a motion to reconsider where an intervenor and alleged owner of the property claimed the mortgage was wiped out by the death of the sole mortgagor, who was only a joint tenant in the property at the time the mortgage was executed.

In this installment of “To Cap or Not to Cap,” which was previously featured on Weil’s Bankruptcy Blog in May of 2015 (see here), we reviewed a recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Kupfer v.

Illinois courts have long recognized that an insolvent corporation’s creditors have standing to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation against its officers and directors. On June 24, 2016, in a case of first impression in Illinois, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, in Caulfield v. The Packer Group, Inc. held that shareholders have standing to pursue a shareholder derivative suit against an insolvent corporation.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, applying California law, has granted summary judgment in favor of a bankruptcy plan administrator for the estate of an insured, holding that the plan administrator is entitled to recover premiums paid to an insurer after the insurer rescinded the policy. In re SONICblue Inc., 2011 WL 839401 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011). The court also held that the insurer is entitled to reimbursement for defense costs paid to the insured prior to the policy’s rescission.