This article examines the NCLT and NCLAT’s power to exercise contempt jurisdiction under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the inconsistent approach taken by different benches.

Although the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) was initially hailed as a welcome reform that would enable timebound and effective insolvency resolution, its tenure has been fraught with issues and uncertainty. One of the issues that remains open is the power to punish for contempt under the Code.

Following W.R. Grace’s filing for bankruptcy in April 2001, a series of cases were filed against Maryland Casualty, which was the company’s primary general liability insurer from 1962 to 1973. Specifically, the twenty-nine plaintiffs in this matter filed a lawsuit relating to their diagnosis of asbestosis, in the District Court of Montana in November 2001. The plaintiffs originally named the State of Montana only. Maryland Casualty was named in March 2002. Additionally, seven of the twenty-nine plaintiffs had previously filed suit against Maryland Casualty, in June 2001.

How deep is the “pool of facts in which it is permissible to fish for the basis of the new cause of action” if a party wishes to benefit from the ‘relation back’ doctrine when calculating limitation periods? The Court of Appeal gives guidance on the meaning of “the same or substantially the same facts” for the purpose of CPR r 17.4(2).

In the recent Chicago bankruptcy case In re Gouletas, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Timothy A. Barnes ruled that obligations are not extinguished by statutes of limitation and, even after the expiration of the limitation period, a creditor retains its rights in collateral so long as the underlying debt is enforceable.

Background

California Governor Jerry Brown recently signed a bill amending the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the California Code of Civil Procedure. The new law, which takes effect January 1, requires disclosures in any communication by a debt collector attempting to collect a time-barred debt. Because the RFDCPA defines the term "debt collector" to include first-party creditors in addition to third-party creditors, auto dealers and finance companies should pay attention.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that, following the confirmation of a foreclosure sale in Illinois, the only remedy available to a borrower under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 was damages, and therefore the one-year limitation period under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) applied and his claims were barred despite the fact that he provided rescission notices within three years of the loan closing, and despite the fact that the parties engaged in back-and-forth communications after the demands were first sent.

This week’s TGIF considers the decision in the matter of Bias Boating Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1524 which deals with leave to join already named defendants to a “mothership” proceeding after expiration of the limitation period

Background

The first plaintiff was appointed administrator of the second plaintiff (the relevant company) on 25 August 2014 and became its liquidator on 29 September 2014.

Introduction

Recently, in Neelkanth Township and Construction Pvt. Ltd. v.Urban Infrastructure Trustees Ltd, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 44 of 2017 (Neelkanth Township), the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) addressed several issues with regard to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, recently reversed the dismissal of a mortgage foreclosure action based on res judicata and the statute of limitations, holding that the Florida Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association and its progeny controlled.

In so ruling, the Court confirmed that a second foreclosure action is not barred by the statute of limitations or res judicata where continuing payment defaults occurred within the five years preceding the filing of the second foreclosure action. 

In B.E. Capital Management Fund LP v. Fund.Com Inc., C.A. No. 12843-VCL (Del. Ch. October 4, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied an appeal from a receiver’s decision disallowing a claim for breach of contract against a company in receivership. The Court held that the appropriate standard of review for an appeal of a receiver’s decision was de novo as to both law and facts, and in particular, that the Court had discretion to consider additional evidence not presented on record to the receiver.