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In a difficult economic climate, commercial landlords may fear that tenant insolvencies mean no one will foot the bill for dilapidations claims at lease expiry – but they are not without recourse.

Overview

The scope and extent of a director's duty is of particular interest to officeholders of companies and their D&O insurers.

Background

The collapse of Carillion in 2018 was arguably the UK's largest corporate insolvency in years, creating a lasting impact through job losses and the derailment of hundreds of public sector projects.

In a welcome clarification for administrators, the UK Supreme Court in the recent case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court[1], held that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not an “officer” of the company for the purposes of section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).

It is a cornerstone of English insolvency law and practice that creditors of a company in financial difficulty should share rateably (“pari passu”) in that company's assets. Put at its simplest, creditors with security should be paid before creditors with no security and unsecured creditors should share rateably between each other. Where an unconnected and unsecured creditor is paid before another creditor in the same category, that payment risks being set aside as a "preference", should the company subsequently enter liquidation or administration. But when does a preference occur?

In this client alert, we set out the key findings by the Court of Appeal in Darty Holdings SAS v Geoffrey Carton-Kelly [2023] EWCA Civ 1135, which considers an appeal against the High Court decision that a repayment by Comet Group plc (“Comet”) of £115 million of unsecured intra-group debt to Kesa International Ltd (“KIL”) was a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”).

Background to the Case

Whilst commonplace in the U.S., uptier transactions in which a borrower teams up with a subset of creditors to issue new “super priority” debt by amending or exchanging existing debt documents, have not been widely used in Europe.

However, with increasing macro economic pressures and financial market instability, we may see more European borrowers taking advantage of flexibility in cov-lite debt documentation to implement liability management transactions as an alternative to, or even as part of, more formal restructurings.