Welcome back to Distressed Debt Legal Insights, Ropes & Gray’s source of timely insights for professionals navigating the complex world of liability management and special situations finance. In this issue we will provide a summary of certain aspects of the noteholder litigation in Wesco that culminated in the recent district court decision approving the 2022 uptier transaction and reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision.
The Original Transaction
In this issue, we spotlight the unfolding litigation between the UCC and Oaktree in TPI Composites’ ongoing bankruptcy, which appears to be headed for a settlement. This case is unusual in that the uptier transformed former equity holders into senior creditors rather than elevating existing lenders.
The Unsecured Creditors Committee Challenge
Welcome back to Distressed Debt Legal Insights, Ropes & Gray’s new source of timely insights for professionals navigating the complex world of liability management. In this edition, we’re looking at how Anthology resolved an objection to its proposed non-pro rata DIP rollup.
Background
Anthology filed for Chapter 11 on Sept. 29 in the Southern District of Texas with a restructuring support agreement signed by 87% of first out lenders and 68% of second out lenders.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Thursday that because Indian tribes are indisputably governments, the Bankruptcy Code unmistakably abrogates their sovereign immunity to bankruptcy court proceedings.
On January 23, the NY DFS released updated guidance with regard to better protecting consumers in the event of virtual currency insolvency. This updated guidance applies to entities that DFS has licensed or chartered to hold or maintain virtual currency assets on behalf of their customers.
Recreational cannabis is now legal in 19 states and Washington D.C., driving the growth of legal cannabis sales estimated at $33 billion this year—up 32% from 2021—and expected to reach $52 billion by 2026.[1] This movement signals that financial investment in cannabis is not abating but accelerating notwithstanding the impact of the lingering COVID-19 pandemic.
As of November 1, 2021, dealers in security-based swaps (“SBS”) whose dealing activity exceeds certain de minimis thresholds (e.g., gross notional amount of $3 billion for credit default SBS, $150 million for other SBS, and $25 million for SBS where the counterparty is a special entity) are required to register with the SEC as a security-based swap dealer (“SBSD”) and to comply with the SEC’s regulations applicable to SBS.
Most restructuring professionals will tell you that there is no “typical” restructuring. That is absolutely true. Every financially distressed business is different and the character and direction of its restructuring will be highly dependent upon, among others, its capital structure, its liquidity profile, and the level of support it can build for its reorganization among key stakeholder bodies. Nevertheless, there are some important similarities in the way that any company should initially address a distressed situation.
This past Monday, July 26, marked passage of the most recent major milestone in the replacement of LIBOR as the benchmark USD interest rate. Following the recommendation of the CFTC’s Market Risk Advisory Committee (MRAC) Interest Rate Benchmark Reform Subcommittee, on July 26, 2021 interdealer brokers replaced trading in LIBOR linear swaps with SOFR linear swaps. This switch is a precursor to the recommendation of SOFR term rates. The switch does not apply to trades between dealers and their non-dealer customers.