A new Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion[fn. 1] involves the motion of a federal inmate, who was also a Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor, for compassionate-release under 18 U.S. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The new Seventh Circuit opinion denies the motion.

Notably, the bankruptcy Debtor/Inmate is serving a 30-year sentence for making false statements during a bankruptcy proceeding The bankruptcy statute is 18 U.S.C. § 152, which declares it is a crime when a person:

Question: What happens when a Chapter 7 debtor:

• fails to disclose the existence of claims against third parties;
• receives a Chapter 7 discharge and a closing of the Chapter 7 case;
• then, pursues the undisclosed claims by filing a lawsuit against the third parties; and
• the defendants in that lawsuit move to dismiss debtor’s claim for non-disclosure in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy?

That actually happened—and a U.S. District Court refused to dismiss the debtor’s lawsuit on summary judgment:

I’m serving on a Drafting Committee of the Uniform Law Commission for a uniform law on assignment for benefit of creditors (“ABC”). A draft of such a uniform law is coming together, with lots of input from many people and organizations. But we are always looking for more input. So, if you’d like to participate in the drafting process, let me know.

I’m serving on a Drafting Committee of the Uniform Law Commission for a uniform law on assignment for benefit of creditors (“ABC”). A draft of such a uniform law is coming together, with lots of input from many people and organizations. And we are always looking for more input!

“A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1192 [Subchapter V], 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not dischargean individual debtor from any debt— . . .”

11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (emphasis added).

Bankruptcy courts applying the foregoing language in the early days of Subchapter V found such language to be clear and unambiguous: that only “an individual debtor” is affected.

A new, bipartisan bankruptcy bill in the U.S. Senate purports, according to an official document, to:

Question: Can a retirement fund organized under Canadian law qualify for a state law exemption requiring that it “qualify as a retirement plan” under the Internal Revenue Code?

This question gets all the way to the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of appeals, which issues a “No” answer, in Green v. Leibowitz, Case No. 23-2841 (decided 7/16/2024).

The general rule is that claims of the bankruptcy estate against third parties (e.g., preference claims and tort claims) can be sold to third parties in a § 363 sale.[Fn. 1]

However, a recent opinion from the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discusses whether a state’s champerty law impairs a § 363 sale.[Fn. 2] 

Four U.S. Supreme Court justices (Kagan, Kavanaugh, Roberts and Sotomayor) provide the following summary of their Purdue Pharmadissent in the Purdue Pharma case.

Wrong & Devastating

Today’s five-justice majority opinion is wrong on the law and devastating for more than 100,000 opioid victims and their families:

简介

最近在Re Guy Kwok-Hung Lam [2023] HKCFA 9一案中，香港终审法院澄清，如果受争议的呈请债务所涉及的协议载有专属司法管辖权条款（「专属条款」），法院应如何处理清盘及破产呈请。

案情

上诉人于2017年与CP Global Inc（「该公司」）及答辩人订立了一份信贷及担保协议（「信贷协议」）。据此，上诉人向该公司提供定期贷款，答辩人就该公司结欠上诉人的所有款项提供个人担保。信贷协议载有专属条款，就该协议所产生或与之有关的所有法律程序赋予纽约法院专属司法管辖权。

于2020年，上诉人认为发生了信贷协议所指的违约事件，故要求答辩人支付信贷协议项下的未偿还本金及利息。答辩人未有按上诉人的要求还款，因此上诉人在香港针对答辩人展开破产法律程序。另一方面，答辩人在纽约提起诉讼，请求法院求宣告并无发生信贷协议下的违约事件。

答辩人反对在香港提出破产呈请的主要理由之一，是专属条款规定上诉人须首先在纽约法院就双方争议进行诉讼，然后才可在香港展开破产程序。