Back in March 2017 the NSW Court of Appeal handed down the unanimous decision in Sanderson as Liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sakr [2017] NSWCA 38 (Sakr), reigning in Brereton J’s application of proportionality to liquidator’s remuneration. This week the decision of in the matter of Australian Company Number 074 962 628 Pty Ltd (in liq) (formerly Colonial Staff Super Pty Ltd) [2017] NSWSC 370 (Colonial Super) was handed down by the NSW Supreme Court. The decision is notable as one of the first applications of the principles enunciated in the Sakr decision.
On 9 March 2017 the NSW Court of Appeal handed down its decision in Sanderson as Liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Sakr [2017] NSWCA 38, unanimously allowing the liquidator’s appeal against a decision of Brereton J applying principles of proportionality and ad valorum to reduce the liquidator’s outstanding remuneration from the $63,000 claimed by the liquidator to $20,000.
In November 2016, the High Court of Australia heard a challenge brought by Clive Palmer in respect of the constitutional validity of the power of a liquidator to examine a former director of a company before the court. At the conclusion of that hearing, Kiefel J, as her Honour then was, stated that the Court was unanimously of the view that the challenge had failed and that reasons would be published later. Yesterday the High Court published those reasons.
The proceedings
Section 447A
JOEL COOK Associate, Litigation and Dispute Resolution Group, McCabes
ANDREW LACEY Principal, Litigation and Dispute Resolution Group, McCabes
legal update
ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL
Varying the scope of the Part 5.3A moratorium on proceedings against companies in voluntary administration.
Background
Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) commonly adopt time-based costing for the calculation of their remuneration, primarily on the basis that it ensures that the IP is only remunerated for the work actually undertaken and it ensures that remuneration reflects the simplicity or complexity of particular tasks. Three other ways in which remuneration are common calculated are ‘fixed fee’, ‘percentage’ (such as in respect of recoveries/realisations) and ‘contingency’ bases.
The bar for recovering assets that have been dubiously transferred out of an insolvent company may not be as high as one might think.
Background
On 14 June 2016, in its judgment delivered in Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 85, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia confirmed that a benefit transferred from a company without authority can only be retained by the recipient in very limited circumstances.
The issue of how causation can be established has been one significant debate in Australian securities class actions involving alleged breaches of the Corporations Act by corporations. It has been unresolved whether shareholders must prove individual reliance on the contravening conduct of companies, or if the conduct affects the market price of shares purchased and/or sold by shareholders is sufficient.
Section 440D imposes a stay on “proceedings in a court” against a company whilst it is in administration under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act. It is well established that the term “proceedings in a court” does not include an arbitration proceeding: see Larkden Pty Limited v Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Limited [2011] NSWSC 1305 at [42] (Hammerschlag J). Notwithstanding this, can the Court use its general power to make orders under s447A to extend the reach of s440D in order to impose a stay on an arbitration against a company in administration?
The recent Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia decision of Templeton v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2015] FCAFC 137 has considered the application of 'proportionality' in determining receivers' remuneration.
Update on McCabes' article " 'Are we there yet' - When are proceedings over for the purposes of enforcement"
The High Court of Australia has refused an application for special leave to appeal the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Sarks v Cassegrain [2015] FCAFC 38, confirming that a judgment issued by the Court on the basis of filing of a certificate of costs assessment is a "final judgment" for the purposes of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and can therefore ground a bankruptcy notice.