Judge Parker of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas recently issued an order in the case of Hilltop SPV, LLC, granting debtor Hilltop SPV LLC’s (“Hilltop”) motion to reject a Gas Gathering Agreement (“GGA”) with counter-party Monarch Midstream, LLC (“Monarch”).[1] This decision allows Hilltop to reject the GGA while allowing Monarch to retain the covenants that run with the land post-rejection.
The Barton doctrine provides that a court-appointed receiver cannot be sued absent “leave of court by which he was appointed.” Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881).
Section 548 of the bankruptcy code authorizes a trustee, debtor, or other appropriate party to avoid actual and constructive fraudulent transfers that occurred prepetition. In order to prove that a transfer was an actual fraudulent transfer, the trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) must prove that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which to debtor was or became…indebted.” 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A).
Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2017 (June 27, 2024)
An appeals court has issued an insightful decision on the availability of damages when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed in bad faith. See Stursberg v. Morrison Sund PLLC, No. 23-1186, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20286 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2024).
The decision addresses both the interplay between Bankruptcy Code sections 303 and 305 and federal preemption of state law.
Under federal law, a debtor may be criminally prosecuted for various kinds of misconduct in connection with a bankruptcy case, including concealing assets, falsifying information, embezzlement, or bribery. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157. The U.S. Trustee, which serves as a watchdog over the bankruptcy process, will refer such cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for investigation and prosecution.
In a welcome clarification for administrators, the UK Supreme Court in the recent case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court[1], held that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not an “officer” of the company for the purposes of section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).
In this client alert, we set out the key findings by the Court of Appeal in Darty Holdings SAS v Geoffrey Carton-Kelly [2023] EWCA Civ 1135, which considers an appeal against the High Court decision that a repayment by Comet Group plc (“Comet”) of £115 million of unsecured intra-group debt to Kesa International Ltd (“KIL”) was a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”).
Background to the Case
Whilst commonplace in the U.S., uptier transactions in which a borrower teams up with a subset of creditors to issue new “super priority” debt by amending or exchanging existing debt documents, have not been widely used in Europe.
However, with increasing macro economic pressures and financial market instability, we may see more European borrowers taking advantage of flexibility in cov-lite debt documentation to implement liability management transactions as an alternative to, or even as part of, more formal restructurings.
This week, the Ninth Circuit addresses whether text messages can violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s prohibition on “prerecorded voice” messages, and it considers whether debtors who paid statutory fees under an unconstitutionally nonuniform bankruptcy provision are entitled to a refund.