The Barton doctrine provides that a court-appointed receiver cannot be sued absent “leave of court by which he was appointed.” Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881).

Section 548 of the bankruptcy code authorizes a trustee, debtor, or other appropriate party to avoid actual and constructive fraudulent transfers that occurred prepetition. In order to prove that a transfer was an actual fraudulent transfer, the trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) must prove that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which to debtor was or became…indebted.” 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A).

An appeals court has issued an insightful decision on the availability of damages when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed in bad faith. See Stursberg v. Morrison Sund PLLC, No. 23-1186, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20286 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2024).

The decision addresses both the interplay between Bankruptcy Code sections 303 and 305 and federal preemption of state law.

Under federal law, a debtor may be criminally prosecuted for various kinds of misconduct in connection with a bankruptcy case, including concealing assets, falsifying information, embezzlement, or bribery. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157. The U.S. Trustee, which serves as a watchdog over the bankruptcy process, will refer such cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for investigation and prosecution.

On June 27, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, addressing the question of whether a company can use bankruptcy to resolve the liability of non-debtor third parties. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and an injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge the claims against a nondebtor without the consent of the affected claimants.

On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. ____ (2024) holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the inclusion of non-consensual third-party releases in chapter 11 plans. This decision settles a long-standing circuit split on the propriety of such releases and clarifies that a plan may not provide for the release of claims against non-debtors without the consent of the claimants.

On June 27, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a 5-4 decision rejecting the nonconsensual releases of the Sackler family in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy case. The split is an interesting alignment of Justices: Gorsuch writing the majority opinion, joined by Thomas, Alito, Barrett and Jackson; Kavanaugh for the dissent, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor and Kagan.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy has long been thought of as anathema to commercial real estate (CRE) lenders. This is due to the debtor-friendly bankruptcy forum, particularly with respect to (i) the up to 18 month exclusivity period during which only the debtor could propose a plan of reorganization and (ii) threats of a "cram-down" plan used to lever concessions from lenders. These provisions can be, and often were, abused by debtors with no real rehabilitative intent using bankruptcy only as a leverage tool.

In its recent German Pellets decision, the Fifth Circuit held that a creditor could not assert its indemnification defenses in a suit brought by the trustee of a liquidation trust because the Chapter 11 plan’s express language permanently enjoined the defenses and the creditor chose not to participate in the debtor’s bankruptcy despite having actual knowledge of it.

The United States Supreme Court recently accepted review of In re Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., 60 F.4th 73 (4th Cir.