There are many reasons to mandate mediation in certain circumstances.

• One is to improve the quality of justice.
• Another is to manage an expanding docket and burgeoning caseload.
• A third is to create a mediation culture where none currently exists.

There are two ways to mandate mediation:

The history of bankruptcy in these United States teaches this:

• bankruptcy laws can provide an efficient and effective solution for a great variety of financial problems.

But bankruptcy laws, in these United States, face significant problems, and their effectiveness is being diminished.

First Problem

Bankruptcy has a fundamental problem: nobody likes it.

Everyone recognizes that bankruptcy laws are a necessity in our market economy. And bankruptcy laws are even founded upon a provision of the U.S. Constitution:

Every now and then, a bankruptcy ruling elicits an “Oh, no!” response from just about everyone.

And then, subsequent case law starts rejecting and/or chipping-away at that “On, no!” ruling.

We have such an “Oh, no!” situation going on right now on a Subchapter V debt-limit issue.

New Rejecting/Chipping-Away Opinion

“金融机构债权人委员会”（简称“金融债委会”）是协商性、自律性、临时性组织，按照市场化、法治化、公平公正、分类施策的原则，依法维护金融机构作为债权人的合法权益。金融债委会可以按照“一企一策”的方针，集体研究增加融资、稳定融资、减少融资、重组等措施，确保债权金融机构形成合力，稳妥化解风险。

在我国经济处于下行期的大环境之下，各地大型民营企业频繁陷入债务危机，越来越多困境企业在庭外债务重组中使用金融债委会机制作为企业和债权人之间沟通的“黏合剂”、债务危机化解的“催化剂”以及与庭内司法重整或和解程序衔接的“融合剂”，由金融债委会主导庭外债务重组程序有效推进，如东旭集团等。本文意在对当前金融债委会机制的制度背景、发展现状、实践中的运行机制、存在的问题及解决方案等方面进行深入分析。

一、金融债委会国内外发展概况及制度优势

（一）国内外金融债委会制度发展概况

1、国外金融债委会制度发展概况

I’m reading a U.S. circuit court’s recent bankruptcy opinion that cites Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). I’m startled by that and blurt out (to myself), “Who cites Stern anymore?!” and “Is Stern still a thing?!” and “I thought Stern has been narrowed to nearly nothing?!”

What creditor would ever want to be an involuntary bankruptcy petitioner under these statements of facts and law:

一、“集中管辖”概述

《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》（下称“《民事诉讼法》”）中，对于“集中管辖”并无明确的规定，而在民事诉讼的司法实践中，存在许多被称为“集中管辖”的做法。实务中，“集中管辖”泛指将某类案件，依照《民事诉讼法》及其他法律法规的相关规定，以司法解释或者通知的形式，集中由某类法院或某个法院管辖的情形。

概括来说，“集中管辖”共分为如下三种情形：

（1）某类法院集中管辖某类案件，如依据《中华人民共和国企业破产法》（下称“《企业破产法》”）第二十一条的规定，破产案件中涉债务人的诉讼案件集中由受理破产申请的人民法院管辖，或者依据《全国法院审理债券纠纷案件座谈会纪要》（以下简称“《债券会议纪要》”）第十条的规定，以发行人或者增信机构为被告提起的要求依约偿付债券本息或者履行增信义务的合同纠纷案件，由发行人住所地人民法院管辖；

（2）某个法院集中管辖某一类型化案件，如各地金融法院集中管辖当地金融案件、各地知识产权法院集中管辖当地知识产权案件；

随着国际形势与经济环境日益复杂严峻，中资美元债市场动荡加剧，频频爆雷，违约数量和金额不断创历史新高。本系列文章第二部分系从英国法和中国内地法探讨中资美元债所涉增信措施——维好协议。对此，笔者已在第二部分上篇中与各位读者分享了英国法下维好协议的效力判定等问题，下篇则将视角回归中国内地法，探寻以下问题：维好协议是否具有约束力？是否构成保证担保？涉及维好协议的域外裁判能否获得中国内地法院的承认与执行？以期为妥善处理和解决适用中国内地法的相关争议探寻参考路径。

第二部分 发债增信担保措施之——维好协议（下）

3. 维好协议在中国内地法律及司法实践中的归类与定性

3.1. 维好协议的产生背景及最新监管政策

Oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. happened on December 4, 2023. Here is a link to the official transcript of such arguments.

My Impression

I’ve read that transcript—and still don’t know what the Court is going to do.

But based on the comments/questions of the justices (which are summarized and compiled below), I do have one impression:

Desperate people do desperate things. And desperation leads even good people astray.

So it is in the world of financial stress. Desperate people do desperate things: like providing sloppy financial statements to creditors, failing to assure that all collateral proceeds go to the proper place, and fudging on the truth here-and-there.