Over the years, I’ve heard lots of people say, “Bankruptcy abuse is a huge problem,” as a self-evident and undeniable proposition.

But here’s the thing. Debtors who try to abuse the bankruptcy system rarely get away with it. That’s because there are too many gatekeepers—and no debtor can fool them all!

The gatekeepers are debtor’s counsel, creditors and their attorneys, U.S. Trustees, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts.

This is the second of a multi-part series of articles on how gatekeepers prevent abuse. This article focuses on creditors and their attorneys.

一、问题的提出

债务人向债权人借款，由保证人提供保证担保。借款到期后，债务人与保证人均未偿还该笔借款。后法院裁定受理保证人的破产申请，债权人因此向保证人的管理人申报债权，要求保证人就债务人所欠借款及利息承担保证责任。管理人审查并确认了该笔债权。（简见以下表1案型法律关系表）根据《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国民法典〉有关担保制度的解释》（下称“《民法典担保制度解释》”）第22条之规定，[1]保证债权应当自保证人的破产申请受理时起停止计息。与债务人破产时保证债权随同主债权停止计息不同的是，保证人破产导致保证债权停止计息，却不能反向及于主债权也停止计息。其后债务人向债权人清偿了部分债务。此时，管理人将面临如下难题：在主债权未停止计息的情况下，债权人获得债务人部分清偿后，在保证人的破产程序中，管理人先前认定的债权数额是否须要调整？如果须要调整，应该如何进行调整？鉴于该问题在实务中相对较为前沿，笔者曾多次尝试检索与之相关的法规、判例、理论文献、实务文章等，对于解决该问题的资料寥寥无几。虽无前人的解决方案可供参照，但该问题仍然亟待解决。在缺乏相应法律规范的情况下，下文将通过民法基础理论的推演，尝试为解决这一问题提供思路。

Over the years, I’ve heard lots of people say, “Bankruptcy abuse is a huge problem,” as a self-evident and undeniable proposition.

But here’s the thing. Debtors who try to abuse the bankruptcy system rarely get away with it. That’s because there are too many gatekeepers—and no debtor can fool them all!

The gatekeepers are debtor’s counsel, creditors and their attorneys, U.S. Trustees, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts.

This is the first of a multi-part series of articles on how the gatekeepers prevent abuse. This article focuses on debtor’s attorney.

I recently heard politicians on all sides of the political divide agree on one thing as self-evident:

• that bankruptcy abuse by “fabulously wealthy corporations” is rampant; and
• Johnson & Johnson is a prime example of that abuse.

Those partisans also agree on this point (again, as self-evident): that every mass tort victim is entitled to his/her:

• day in court; and
• before a jury of peers.

That’s the Civics 101 ideal, right?

Widely Disparate Results

企业出现债务危机时，通常首选通过续贷、增益担保、延期支付等各种方式进行化解，避免债务危机扩散影响自身经营和市场竞争力。庭外债务重组往往是在企业通过诸多努力仍难以遏制危机蔓延时才会提出。启动庭外债务重组时，绝大多数债务人已无法全额清偿到期债务，同时还可能存在多项诉讼或仲裁、银行账户被冻结甚至资产被司法处置等不利情形。在此情况下，债权人很难相信债务人仅凭自身架构调整或经营方案优化可以摆脱债务危机，其更希望看到有投资人参与到重组中，为其债权回收提供更多可能性；债务人亦需要引入投资人为其提供资金、业务等全方位的支持，并以此为基础与债权人协商解决债务问题。因此，在庭外债务重组中引入投资人是债权人和债务人的共识。庭外债务重组实践中，鲜少出现没有投资人参与而由债务人与债权人自行完成重组的案例。

一、投资人的类型

国有企业重组是指通过收购、划转、合并、分立、资产剥离、混改（包括科改）等方式，对国有企业进行重新组织，以实现资源优化配置、企业整体竞争力提升的效果。其中，公司分立是一种常见的重组模式，多适用于分拆上市、解决同业竞争、突出主营业务等场景。笔者结合近期项目经验，就国有企业以分立方式实施重组所涉及的相关法律问题进行探讨。

一、公司分立的基本流程及国企分立特别程序

根据《关于做好公司合并分立登记支持企业兼并重组的意见》（工商企字〔2011〕226号）第二条[1]，公司分立是一个公司分成两个或两个以上的公司，包括存续分立和新设分立两种形式。存续分立是一个公司分立成两个以上公司，本公司继续存续，同时设立一个及以上新的公司。新设分立是一个公司分立为两个及以上新的公司，本公司解散。无论采用哪种形式的分立，公司分立前的债务均由分立后的公司承担连带责任。公司分立的常规流程包括制定分立方案、通过分立决议、编制资产负债表和财产清单、签订分立协议、公告及通知债权人及办理公司分立登记。将于2024年7月1日施行的新修订《公司法》增加了“国家企业信用信息公示系统”作为公告的平台（不再仅限于登报公告），其余关于分立的规定并无实质性变化。

The American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force has issued its “Preliminary Report” on “Maintaining the $7,500,000 Debt Cap for Subchapter V Eligibility.” This article quotes from and summarizes the Report.

Recommendation

The Task Force recommends making permanent the $7,500,000 debt cap for Subchapter V eligibility, which is set to expire and revert to $3,024,725 on June 21, 2024.

Supporting Factors

Congress, the federal appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme Court all need to recognize this historical reality:

• bankruptcy is an efficient and effective tool for resolving mass tort cases, as demonstrated by cases with huge-majority approval votes from tort victims.

And all those institutions need to prevent anti-bankruptcy biases, legal technicalities, and hold-out groups from torpedoing the huge-majority votes.

Supreme Court moving in the right direction?

随着社会发展与商业模式的不断丰富，不同商事主体之间会因愈发复杂的交易往来产生繁多的债权债务关系，整体经济环境下行、转入逆周期的情况下，债务危机频频爆发，债务重组已成为债务危机化解的一种重要方式，而债务重组能否成功的关键因素取决于是否存在契合企业、债权人、投资人甚至政府或监管机关要求的重组方案，故债务重组方案的设计是债务重组的重中之重。本文结合相关项目经验，对债务重组方案设计的总体思路及流程，以及中介机构在重组方案设计时的角色作用提出探讨，以期更好地促进债务重组工作之推进。

一、重组范围

This is the fourth in a series of four articles on why Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9031, titled “Masters Not Authorized,” needs to be amended to authorize the utilization of special masters in complex bankruptcy cases.

The focus of this fourth article is on how federal courts have inherent authority to appoint special masters—and why that inherent authority should not be denied in bankruptcy cases.[Fn. 1]

Inherent Authority of Courts of Equity